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"The true story as it emerges from the confidential 
documents is, in my personal view, painfully at variance 
with a lot of the published versions. In saying this, I refer, 
of course, only to the political and other motives of each 
government. I fear it will be some years before this bit of 
history can be published." 
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A widely adopted historical view of the creation of the Antarctic Treaty and 
the subsequent development of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) places the 
United States at the centre of both. 
It is suggested that this view is too simple and the genesis of the ATS 
remains poorly understood. It is accepted that the US supplied much of the 
political drive which led to the Treaty and that there could have been no 
Treaty without at least the acquiescence of the USSR, Argentina and Chile. 
It is clear, however, that none of the twelve signatories to the Antarctic 
Treaty, other than Britain, had any clear idea as to how the consultative 
procedure, for which the Treaty provides, was to be positively used. 
The dissertation concentrates on the first three Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meetings (Canberra 1961, Buenos Aires 1962, and Brussels 1964), and finds 
that the British had a clear idea as to their positive objectives and were 
partially successful in achieving them. Previously unavailable diaries written 
by Dr. Brian Roberts (Head of Polar Regions Section in the Foreign Office 
from 1943 to 1975) serve as the primary source for this study, along with 
official Foreign Office documents from the period and secondary sources 
from Britain and around the world. The negotiations are traced with regard to 
1. The successful conclusion of the Agreed Measures for the conservation of 
Antarctic Fauna and Flora 
2. The foundation and location of a secretariat 
3. The arrangements for telecommunications in the Antarctic 
4. The need for clarification over the question of jurisdiction 
- Once these have been considered one can reasonably conclude that Dr. 
Roberts was the driving force between 1961 and 1964 behind a British 
attempt to strengthen the Treaty against its perceived weaknesses with a 
view to the long-term stability of the ATS. 
Having established this, attention is then turned to the wider question of 
whether Britain had a more formative role in the negotiation of the Treaty 
itself than the widely circulated view allows. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his State of the Union message to the Congress on January 7, 1960, 
President Eisenhower declared with regard to the Antarctic Treaty: 
"There is one instance where our initiative for peace has recently been 
successful. A multilateral treaty signed last month provides for the exclusively 
peaceful use of Antarctica, assured by a system of inspection" (US 
Government printing office 1964). 
The Antarctic Treaty, which was signed at the height of the Cold War, has 
been described as a most remarkable achievement (Myhre 1986: 23). It 
embodied US policy objectives as laid down in a 1958 policy statement for 
the region. These were: (1) to prevent the use of Antarctica for military 
purposes; (2) to provide for freedom of scientific investigation; (3) to establish 
an orderly joint administration of Antarctica by the countries directly 
concerned; and, (4) to preserve Antarctica for peaceful purposes only (Joyner 
& Theis 1997: 29). The Treaty bound the US and the USSR to demilitarise 
the whole continent, ban nuclear testing in the region and allow the 
inspection of facilities on the continent. It was also remarkable in that it bound 
Britain, Argentina and Chile to freeze their overlapping territorial claims for 
the duration of the Treaty. The territorial claims of Australia, New Zealand, 
France and Norway were also frozen. 
The actions of President Eisenhower, such as his spring 1958 invitation to 
the eleven nations to attend the 1959 Washington Conference and his 
message to Congress of 1960, have prompted contemporary historians to 
support the view that "the United States was not only the chief architect of 
this (the Antarctic Treaty) agreement but its foremost supporter as well" 
(Joyner & Theis 1997: 29). Over the last three and a half decades this view of 
the creation of the Antarctic Treaty and evolution of the Antarctic Treaty 
System has become the predominant interpretation. While the evidence 
suggests that the political capital of the United States, along with the 
acquiescence of the USSR, Argentina and Chile, was required in order that 
an agreement in the region could be achieved in 1959, it is clear that other 
states strongly influenced the creation of the Antarctic Treaty. Similarly, the 
evidence now points to the conclusion that the evolution of the Antarctic 
8 
Treaty System was strongly influenced between 1961 and 1964 by the 
British. 
Article IX of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty ordered that the "Contracting Parties 
named in the preamble to the present Treaty shall meet at the City of 
Canberra within two months after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, 
and thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging 
information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to 
Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and recommending to their 
Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the 
Treaty" (Antarctic Treaty 1961: Article IX). 
It has been suggested that few, if any, of the governments invited to the 
Washington Conference in 1959 were attracted by the positive aspects of the 
Treaty (Heap 1983: 105). The evidence presented in this thesis advances the 
theory that few states had any clear idea as to how the Treaty could be 
positively advanced using the consultative procedure, as outlined in Article IX 
of the Treaty, between 1961 and 1964. The one apparent exception to this 
rule is the stance taken by the British during this period. 
The dissertation concentrates on the first three Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meetings, in Canberra 1961, Buenos Aires 1962 and Brussels 1964. The 
main primary source used in the dissertation is the personal journal of Dr. 
Brian Roberts. Having inaugurated Operation 'Tabarin' in 1943 in order to 
maintain the British claim of sovereignty in the Falkland Island Dependencies 
against Argentine encroachments, he was appointed to the Foreign Office in 
1944 (King & Savours 1995: 126). From 1946 until his retirement in 1975 
Roberts was the Head of the Polar Regions Section at the Foreign Office; he 
thus should be seen as the central figure behind British planning during this 
period. His diaries serve as a complete record of the first three consultative 
meetings. They not only represent the daily record as recalled by Roberts, 
but within each report Roberts incorporated appropriate parts of official 
telegrams sent to Whitehall from the meetings. Therefore the journals can be 
said to include a collective appreciation by the British delegation at the three 
meetings as well as personal reflections (Roberts 1959: 2). This is the first 
occasion upon which the diaries have been available for public consultation 
and they paint events of the period in a different light from those histories 
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which have gone before and call for some revision of the predominant 
interpretation of events. 
The other major primary sources are the set of official Foreign Office 
telegrams sent to the incumbent Foreign Secretary by the head of the British 
delegation at the end of each of the Consultative Meetings. These, too, have 
been previously unavailable and serve as an overall record of the thinking of 
the delegations and the extent to which British objectives had been achieved 
and how best obstacles could be overcome at future negotiations. Other 
sources used in the dissertation include documents from Roberts' colleague 
Sir Martin Holdgate and personal communications from Dr. Warren Reynolds 
(part of the American delegation 1961 & 1962, and member of the 
Conference secretariat at the Washington Conference 1959) and from R. 
Tucker Scully, currently Director of Oceans and Polar Affairs at the US State 
Department. Other sources come from the available records from parties 
involved in negotiations and meetings, as well as previously published works 
from around the world. 
Sir Esler Dening who had been head of the British delegation at the 1959 
Washington Conference made it clear that the British saw the substance of 
the Antarctic Treaty as only a partial success: 
"It was originally the view of the United Kingdom that some organisation, 
vested with more effective and comprehensive powers than that which is now 
contemplated, would have been desirable, but in deference to the views of 
others we are prepared to subscribe to a less far-reaching scheme in the 
interests of general agreement" (Dening 1959: 36). 
These sources make it clear that the British understood that the Treaty might 
in the future come under strain due to the nature of the consensual 
agreement reached in 1959. In order, therefore, to st~engthen the Treaty with 
a view to the long term stability of the Treaty System, the British initiated a 
series of short-term objectives to be attempted at Consultative Meetings. It 
was hoped that in the long term the result of these short-term successes 
would not only be a strengthening of the Treaty System as a whole but would 
also bring the Treaty somewhat closer to what the British had envisaged 
before 1959. The ultimate objective was to put a permanent end to disputes 
in the area by in some way internationalising the Antarctic (Roberts 1961: 3). 
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The short-term objectives initiated by the British between 1961 and 1964 can 
be shown by following the negotiations over four major areas of the Treaty. 
First, the British believed that any decision made on the creation and home of 
a Secretariat would have far-reaching effects on the growth of the infant 
Treaty (Roberts 1961: 3). The British were strongly in favour of establishing 
such an administrative body in Canberra and opposed to its location in 
Washington. Second, the negotiations on telecommunications can be seen to 
be a lightning rod for political questions pertaining to sovereignty during the 
period. It was vital for the British that the Scientific Committee on Antarctic 
Research (SCAR - a non-governmental organisation) should play an active 
role in this debate but should be kept outside political questions. Third, it was 
felt that the question of jurisdiction, which had been avoided in the text of the 
Treaty, should be addressed and clarified. The fourth area, the conservation 
of Antarctic fauna and flora, can be seen as the British using science and 
conservation as a cloak for the securing of a long-term objective. The 1964 
Agreed Measures have been seen as the major accomplishment (and 
sometimes the only accomplishment of substance) of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings between 1961 and 1964. It is possible to conclude that 
this was not only a British initiative but largely a British accomplishment; and 
that it represented both a conservation measure and an agreement with far-
reaching implications for the future of the Treaty System. 
Given British influence from 1961 to 1964 and the clear long- and short-term 
planning of the British (guided by Roberts) it would seem strange that the 
widely circulated view of the creation of the Antarctic Treaty places limited 
emphasis on the British contribution. While some of the key documents 
remain to be released by Her Majesty's Government, it is clear from the 
journals and the 9fficial documents that the British played a more influential 




THE CREATION OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM: PREVIOUS INTERPRETATIONS 
A. THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE PREPARATORY NEGOTIATIONS FOR 
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 
Since the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 and the conclusion of the 
first three Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings in 1964, historians have 
tended to adopt a particular interpretation of the creation and evolution of the 
ATS, which places greatest emphasis on the American contribution and which 
is largely derived from American sources. Influential examples of this 
interpretation are to be found in Peterson (1988), Quigg (1983), Beck (1986) 
and Myhre (1986). Most recently, this view has been restated by Joyner and 
Theis (1997). 
Myhre argued that the Treaty was spawned by events prior to 1959 by a 
United States State Department that faced a possible war between its South 
American and European allies and that lacked a policy with which to address 
a potentially sensitive problem.(1986:23)(see also Child 1988: 18; Hayton 
1960:352; Maquieria 1986: 52; Watts 1992:4). 
From 1946 onwards several incidents, described as sabre-rattling for 
domestic consumption in Argentina, subsequently occurred between 
Argentina and the British (Myhre 1986:25). Due to the sensitivity over 
sovereignty in the area, Beck believed that these disputes over "facilities" 
which would normally have been considered minor came to be regarded as 
serious by officials in Washington and London (1986:38). These problems 
were exacerbated by the territorial claims of Chile in the region, and 
Washington was sufficiently concerned to issue a policy planning staff paper 
in June 1948 : 
"It is a source of embarrassment to the United States because of our close 
relation to Great Britain and our commitments in the Western Hemisphere. 
This embarrassment is susceptible of exploitation by the USSR to the further 




settlement of this dispute be reached which will be acceptable to the three 
countries involved" (Foreign Relations of the US 1948:979). 
According to Beck, in the late 1940s various methods of containing the 
sovereignty problem through internationalisation were considered in 
Washington. These included UN. trusteeship or a multi-nation condominium 
composed of interested powers. The Escudero declaration, made in 1948 by 
a Chilean Professor who would later represent his country at the Washington 
conference, espoused an alternative international scheme for the region, 
which some have seen as a forerunner for the principles laid down in the 
1959 Treaty (1986:39)(see also Hanessian 1959:436; Triggs 1986:132).This 
was perhaps the only positive response to American proposals of this time, 
which foundered upon the ambitions of the Antarctic claimants (Beck 
1986:40). Myhre (1986:30) claimed that, by 1950 the US had become heavily 
involved in the planning and execution of the Korean War and also in that 
year, the chance of an eight state accord in the region lessened after the 
USSR issued a note to six of the claimant states (excluding Chile with whom 
diplomatic relations had been severed) and the US demanding that any 
Antarctic agreement should include the USSR ( see also Elliot 1994:29). 
The predominant interpretation of the creation of the Antarctic Treaty then 
moves from this period to the mid 1950s and places great importance on the 
scientific community and the International Geophysical Year (IGY), which is 
seen as a catalyst for improved international co-operation in the region 
(Sahurie 1992:xxiii). The origins of the IGY can be traced back to an 
American, Dr. L.V. Berkner, who made the suggestion of an IGY in 1950 to a 
gathering of international scientists in the home of Professor J.A. Van Allen at 
Silver Springs, Maryland (Jones 1959: 383). The recommendations 
formulated there were included at a meeting of the International Council of 
Scientific Unions (ICSU) who by 1952 had established a committee to 
formulate plans for what scientists envisaged would be a Third Polar Year in 
1957 - 58. In 1953, ICSU expanded these plans creating a Comite Special 
de L'Annee Geophysique lnternationale (CSAGI) which submitted scientific 
plans in 1954. 
Joyner and Theis asserted that the IGY Antarctic fieldwork which began in 
1957 "revived interest in the idea of establishing an international regime for 
the area" (1997:30). They suggested that by promoting research on 
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meteorology, the upper atmosphere, cosmic rays and other areas, the IGY 
inaugurated a unique scientific effort (1997:30). The polar regions saw a 
concentrated scientific effort during the IGY with twelve nations operating 66 
stations in Antarctica. Once again Joyner and Theis placed the United States 
at the forefront of this effort, having five stations : Little America, Byrd, 
Amundsen-Scott, Ellsworth and Wilkes (1997:4). 
The 1955 resolution by scientists that IGY activities were merely temporary 
measures and that they did "not modify the existing status of the Antarctic 
regarding the relations of the participating countries" (Joyner & Theis) 
allowed there to be successes on two fronts during the IGY. The most 
obvious were the scientific successes but the more subtle success had 
implications for a future Antarctic Treaty. During the IGY an understanding 
was reached between the participating nations that scientific activities would 
be non-political and would therefore not serve as a basis for territorial claims. 
In many ways this can be seen as a precursor to the freezing of territorial 
claims under the 1959 Treaty (Chaturvedi 1990:89). 
Peterson's widely accepted understanding of the period 1958 - 59 is that the 
United States pursued its initiatives and that other participants responded 
positively due to the relative salience which Antarctic matters had acquired by 
then (Peterson 1988:67). Joyner and Theis asserted that it was US 
perseverance that secured an agreement that would continue the co-
operation that prevailed during the IGY and preserve the continent as a zone 
of peace. In this way "the origins of the Treaty can be traced directly to 
American efforts" (1997:30). It is clear that the sovereignty problems in the 
region had not been solved despite American concerns aired in the late 
1940s. ~oyner and Theis claimed that in 1958: 
"the United States took the lead. Indeed the Antarctic Treaty represents the 
culmination of a series of negotiations initiated by the US. government" 
(1997:32). 
In that year President Eisenhower sent a letter to the seven claimant nations 
and the five other nations with scientific interests in the area stating that there 
should be a conference held to draw up a Treaty concerning the future of 
Antarctica. On May 3, 1958, Eisenhower stressed that the purpose of the 
conference was to prevent the continent from becoming "an object of political 
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conflict" as well as to keep the continent "open to all nations to conduct 
scientific and other peaceful activities" (Dept. of State 1958:910). 
B. THE PREPARATORY NEGOTIATIONS, THE WASHINGTON 
CONFERENCE 1959 AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 
The predominant interpretation asserts that "having initiated the preparatory 
talks and provided the venue, the US maintained a high profile throughout, 
exerting a major influence on the course and outcome of the negotiations" 
(Beck 1985:663). In November 1958, -Ambassador Daniels of the US 
delegation presented a number of draft articles which incorporated many of 
the themes raised in previous discussions. Although these were depicted as 
informal working papers, they could have reasonably been described as a 
draft Treaty. Beck argued that in 1959, much of the material in this draft was 
included in the fourteen articles of the Antarctic Treaty itself (1985:662). 
It is clear from Beck's sources that Ambassador Daniels was especially 
prominent in these preparatory negotiations, and his "personal influence was 
pervasive in peacemaking, smoothing points of controversy through semantic 
gymnastics, and providing working papers which ensured a strong US 
influence in the final Treaty" (1985:663). The Department of State had 
realised that these negotiations would not be easy, given the positions of 
Chile and Argentina and the Cold War political tension between the US. and 
the USSR. Although the Geneva discussions on nuclear weapons testing in 
1958 and the preparation for Khrushchev's visit to Camp David in 1959 aided 
negotiation, Daniels is considered to be the chief positive mover of this 
period, while Ledovski (the head of the Soviet delegation) has been portrayed 
as a sticker, creating blockages delaying the progress of the negotiations 
(Beck 1985:663). 
Quigg accepted the view that a transformation in the Soviet attitude occurred 
in April 1959 after Ambassador Daniels had met with the Soviet Ambassador 
in Washington, Mikhail Menshikov (1983:146) . While the reasons for the 
alteration in the Soviet position have never been made public, Beck believed 
that due to the constraints of the period the acquiescence on the part of the 
USSR proved decisive in clearing the way for the Washington Conference 
(1985:663). 
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Joyner and Theis asserted that the influence exerted by the US in drafting the 
Treaty during the Washington Conference is reflected in the Preamble 
(1997:33). This emphasises two cardinal objectives that the US had 
championed: the peaceful use of the continent and scientific co-operation 
(Herter 1959: 1). If one compares the March 1958 US policy statement 
proposals with some of the fourteen articles in the Antarctic Treaty, then the 
major American goals seem to have been achieved within the text of the 
Treaty. The first goal, the demilitarisation of the continent, is reflected in 
Article I. The building of military bases and fortifications is prohibited, 
weapons may not be tested and military manoeuvres are controlled. Likewise, 
Article V bans nuclear explosions, thereby fulfilling another American goal, 
that of preserving Antarctica for peaceful purposes only. The third US goal, to 
provide for freedom of scientific investigation is embodied in Articles II and Ill, 
which stipulate the free exchange of research data and results as well as 
personnel (1997:34). The fourth US goal, the establishment of an orderly joint 
administration of Antarctica by the countries directly concerned is more 
difficult to pinpoint in one article. One could argue that the freezing of 
territorial claims in the innovative Article IV makes it possible to view Article 
IX (which calls for a Canberra meeting after ratification of the Treaty and 
regular meetings thereafter) as a framework for the orderly joint 
administration of Antarctica by the countries directly concerned. Certainly, 
since no administrative body was formally created Article IX assumed 
particular importance (Joyner & Theis 1997:35). Joyner and Theis further 
asserted that the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings, which grew out of 
Article IX of the Treaty have been "largely responsible for the evolution of the 
politico-legal framework for managing the Antarctic and has generated a 
multifaceted system consisting of the treaty itself and several auxiliary 
instruments concluded pursuant to it"(1997:36). 
C. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 1961 - 1964 
The generally accepted understanding of the evolution of the Antarctic Treaty 
System regards the Antarctic Treaty as the barest outline of a regime. 
Therefore , in order for the regime to function effectively, Peterson believed, 
participating governments had to work out a number of procedures and add a 
number of rules (1988:92). Little of substance has been written about the first 
three consultative meetings and the rule of confidentiality has often been 
cited as the major reason for this. Peterson has regarded the rule on 
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confidentiality as a screen behind which Consultative Parties hide (1988:94). 
Auburn believed that "general confidence in the work of the meetings is not 
encouraged by the secrecy of the actual proceedings" (1978:500). 
The little that has been written on the first three Consultative Meetings views 
the activity resulting in relatively minor additions necessary for maintaining 
the regime (Peterson1988:92). The common interpretation asserts that during 
this period participating governments took the bare outline of the authority 
granted in the Treaty and created a system of rule making in order to serve 
all of their needs (Peterson 1988:94).-Joyner and Theis supported the 
accepted understanding that the first important addition to the Antarctic 
regime came in 1964 within the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of 
Antarctic flora and fauna (1997:44). Joyner and Theis viewed this as a formal 
legal agreement which showed the commitment of the participating 
governments to place considerable emphasis on conservation and 
environmental obligations (1997:44). 
In the course of elucidating the predominant interpretation, some historians 
have accessed sources outside the United States which have hinted that a 
different interpretation of events might exist. Quigg, for example, noted that 
during a press conference given by Macmillan in February 1958, the British 
Prime Minister acknowledged that he had been holding discussions with the 
Australian and New Zealand premiers on the question of the Antarctic 
(1983: 143). Beck, while acknowledging Daniels' input in the preparatory 
meetings, noted that contributions made by Roberts behind the scenes were 
significant (1986:64). Equally, Myhre asserted that during the first 
consultative meeting, the British took the lead on the question of conservation 
(1986:47), while Beck claimed that the environmental protection role 
"accorded with the personal interests of those involved in Consultative 
Meetings, and Brian Roberts of the UK. has been oft-cited in this connection" 
(1986:21 8) . 
On the basis of previously unreleased British sources - the official Foreign 
Office delegation reports between 1959 and 1964 and the journals of Roberts 
- this thesis is able to propose important revisions to the previously dominant 
interpretation of the creation and evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System 
which has emphasised the role of the US delegation. 
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Whereas the post-war years prior to 1961 have received much attention, 
commentators have paid less attention to the question of the influence of 
participating nations during period 1961 - 1964 . The next three chapters will 
therefore seek to study the question of influence on the evolution of the 
Treaty between 1961 and 1964, while the fifth chapter will return to the 
accepted understanding of events until 1961 and using previously 
unavailable material from official British foreign office papers and the Roberts 
diaries will attempt to illustrate the limitations of the widely circulated view 
discussed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER2 
BRITISH INFLUENCE ON THE FIRST ANTARCTIC TREATY 
CONSULTATIVE MEETING, CANBERRA 1961 
A. BRITISH OBJECTIVES 
Beck believed that the Antarctic Treaty embodied both static and dynamic 
qualities, allowing it to perpetuate the relative international stability of the 
period immediately prior to 1959 anti also enabling the regime to adapt to 
demands imposed upon it by a changing world (1986:66). This view is 
reflected in the writing of Roberts_ who wrote in the introduction to his 
personal journal of the First Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in 1961: 
"In relation to such a large region, the idea of the Antarctic Treaty was 
something new in the history of international relations. The treaty did little 
more ... than create a framework for international co-operation, leaving the 
Contracting Parties to feel their way towards the practical arrangements 
which will be necessary to make that co-operation a reality" .1 
It is clear that the British had a clear set of objectives prior to the meeting in 
Canberra. and these can be most clearly seen in a general brief largely 
written by Roberts, although slightly amended by the American Department at 
the Foreign Office, which was drafted for the British delegation at Canberra in 
June 1961.2 In this brief, the principal United Kingdom objectives both for the 
first Consultative Meeting and for the long-term future of the Antarctic Treaty 
System were addressed. It was noted that the Antarctic Treaty produced the 
two positive advantages of scientific research and the provision for non-
militarisation in . the Treaty zone.3 Also noted was the freezing principle 
pertaining to territorial claims which was to be of most interest to the British: 
"whose original hope and aim was to put a permanent end to the disputes in 
the area by internationalising the Antarctic. In varying degree, however, most 
of the signatory governments were against any kind of international regime, 
prominent amongst the opponents on th is issue being Australia, Argentina 
and Chile" .4 
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The brief made it clear that the ultimate long-term objective of the British was 
to bring about whatever progress could be made in the direction of a true 
international regime. It was accepted that this objective might not be possible 
during the currency of the Treaty and that this objective should never be 
made apparent to other delegations, as. it could obstruct progress towards 
improved international co-operation in the area. 5 
Attention was then turned to short-term objectives which were proposed in 
order that the Consultative Meeting produced some solid results and not 
merely a series of platitudes doing no more than reaffirming the principles 
established in the Treaty.6 Solid results were important, it was asserted, for 
two main reasons. First, it was felt that public opinion would be disillusioned if 
nothing worthwhile emerged from the meeting. Second, failure to produce any 
solid results at an early stage might have discouraged those actively 
engaged in Antarctic work and would tend to make the future development of 
the Treaty as a live force more difficult.7 If this were to occur the fear was that 
this could adversely effect the legal protection of British rights derived from 
Article IV, because "to the extent that the Treaty was permitted ever to 
become a dead letter, Article IV would tend to become one too". 8 
The second consideration would appear to have been of highest priority to 
the British between 1961 and 1964, and the brief called for the United 
Kingdom delegation to risk controversy rather than permit emasculated 
recommendations, particularly with relation to four of the 22 agenda items 
which concern the preservation and conservation of living resources; the 
arrangements for radio communications; the preservation of historical sites; 
and co-operation in mail services.9 The first two of these agenda items should 
be viewed as two of the major British concerns reoccurring as themes 
throughout the first three Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings. 
The third main area of interest concerns the question of a Secretariat. This is 
not unrelated to the question of SCAR and the foundation of adequate treaty 
machinery, and it is clear that between the years 1961 and 1964 this question 
is a consideration in its own right. The brief asserts that the British: 
"should attach considerable importance to this item and do everything 
possible to ensure that a good foundation is laid for the Treaty 
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machinery ... [and] the concept of a separate technical advisory group ... which 
could deal with technical questions from which politics cannot be entirely 
eliminated" .10 
The question of a Secretariat had clearly been a primary concern for the 
British since the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty. Roberts had taken the 
opportunity of discussing tactics for the Canberra Consultative Meeting 
during his visits to Australia and New Zealand prior to joining the United 
States Operation "Deep Freeze 61" as official United Kingdom observer for 
the Antarctic season 1960 - 61. In November 1960, Roberts met with Dr. 
Phillip Law, the head of the Australian Antarctic Division at the Department of 
External Affairs. Although the Australian and British had differed in the late 
1950s over their approach to the question of territorial claims in Antarctica, 
there was an understanding between the two nations which resulted in an 
ability in 1960/61 to conceive the same problems and to arrive at the same 
conclusions. It must be noted that neither Roberts nor Law had heard from 
their representatives working on agenda items for the First Consultative 
Meeting in Washington and that their discussions therefore amounted to no 
more than an informal exchange of views. Nevertheless, Roberts was 
encouraged by the fact that Law (who would be chief advisor to the Australian 
delegation at the first Consultative Meeting) was "in full agreement with all of 
our proposals and will support all of them when they reach him through 
Canberra. His opinion was that the Canberra people had not yet given much 
thought to any details" .11 
In particular, Law appeared most anxious that any Secretariat should be 
located in Canberra and that "they are in agreement with us in wishing for 
something quite small along the lines we have proposed" .12 
Similarly, on the 23 November, Roberts met with Mr. A.O. McIntosh, 
Secretary of External Affairs, in New Zealand. On this occasion McIntosh 
asked Roberts to outline his views about the ag'enda for the Canberra 
Meeting, suggesting that the New Zealanders had not yet formulated any 
policy and would like to know what the British thought. 13 Although Roberts did 
not touch upon jurisdiction, McIntosh saw no reason why New Zealand should 
not agree with the British on every single suggestion. McIntosh clearly saw 
the Secretariat as the most important item and favoured a very small 
secretariat, preferably with a southern hemisphere capital. He showed no 
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sign of wanting it in Wellington and even hinted that New Zealand would 
support an English location, although he believed that Canberra might be the 
most suitable. 14 These two meetings tend to support the view that during the 
formative years of the evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System, the British 
had very clear ideas as to their long- and short-term objectives and had 
special relat ionships with certain Consultative Parties that were inclined to 
agree with and support British proposals for the evolution of an Antarctic 
Treaty System. 
In the introduction to the journal of the first Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting, Roberts made four salient points relating to future international co-
operation in the area and British objectives. First, he attached considerable 
importance to the first meeting, believing it would set the tone for future co-
operation under the Treaty. Second, it was noted that the Contracting Parties 
were an unusual grouping in terms of international politics of that period and 
that "we are embarking on a new form of co-operation" .15 Third, Roberts 
clearly saw Antarctic research as a primary concern but believed that 
satisfactory research in the region depended on the effectiveness of the legal 
protection given by Article IV of the Treaty. He concluded that the British no 
longer had to "match Argentine and Chilean claims - blow by blow - in order 
to safeguard our legal position" .16 Roberts considered the events of the 
1940s and 1950s to be "out of keeping with world opinion and must be 
replaced by something altogether more adult" .17 Finally, Roberts asserted 
that the British would primarily aim to gain practical progress towards uniform 
legislation for the Treaty area from the meeting. However, it was noted that 
other parties regard this aim as too controversial due to it being too 
suggestive of the notion of "full internationalisation of the Antarctic which has 
all along been our aim" .18 Thus he conceded that the British "may not be able 
to achieve much in this direction to start with" .19 
B. THE CONSERVATION OF WILDLIFE - FIRST ANTARCTIC TREATY 
CONSULTATIVE MEETING, CANBERRA 1961. 
"The first concrete expression of concern for conservation measures among 
the ACTP's (Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties) came in 1964 with the 
Agreed measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna ... It was 
the United States that initially recommended the adoption of the Agreed 
Measures. Their purpose was manifold; to protect native birds, mammals, and 
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plant life on the continent, safeguard against the introduction of non-
indigenous species, prevent water pollution near the coast ice shelves, and 
preserve the unique character of natural ecological systems." 
(Joyner & Theis 1997: 103) 
J.D. Myhre is one of the few commentators who has attempted to research 
the first Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in detail. He recognised that 
the initial discussions in Canberra w~re hampered by the suddenness of the 
meeting due to it being set for two months after the Antarctic Treaty entered 
into force. Thus he concluded that the preparation of conservation positions 
was somewhat hurried. He did, however, recognise that when the meeting 
turned its attention to the question of conservation "the British took the lead in 
proposing that a recently passed resolution of SCAR be adopted as a 
Recommendation" ( 1986 :4 7). 
Beck supported the view that this initiative came from the British: "this role 
(environmental protection) accorded with the personal interests of those 
involved with the Consultative Meetings, and Brian Roberts of the UK has 
been oft-cited in this connection. This sense of responsibility pervaded the 
system's work during its first decade" (1986:218). 
The evidence provided in the primary sources below supports the view that 
the Agreed Measures, which have come to be seen as the major achievement 
of the first three Consultative Meetings, were a British initiative and were 
driven through largely by the continued efforts of the British during the period 
1961 - 64. 
A letter from the secretary of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, 
Dr. Gordon Robin, dated 14 February 1961, suggested that nations should 
draft applicable regulations relating to the conservation of nature in 
Antarctica. A draft by Roberts, dated 3 July 1961, based upon the 
recommendations by made by SCAR represented the British draft initiative, 
which called for a "convention for the protection of wild life in Antarctica". This 
was re-drafted on 9 July by Roberts and Arthur Watts, a legal advisor (see 
appendix 1 ). 
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-Two days after arriving in Canberra for the first Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting, Roberts began redrafting these proposals for wild-life conservation 
based upon informal discussions with the Australian and the American 
delegation. Roberts had clearly discussed the short- and long-term British 
objectives with John Freeland, one of the UK's legal advisers, for after: 
"discussions with John Freeland in London, I want to experiment with the idea 
of initiating a series of conventions to regulate Antarctic affairs. To make 
some beginning with a concerted procedure for dealing with legislative 
matters seems to me more important than any practical needs of 
conservation. This is a good subject to start with because the basic idea of 
wild life protection is not controversial ... The SCAR recommendations are 
very familiar to me because I attended all the meetings of the Working Group 
which drafted them in my room at the SPRI [Scott Polar Research Institute, 
University of Cambridge]".20 
Sir Martin Holdgate, in a personal communication (21 May 1997), accepted 
the primacy of the British with regard to an agreement on the conservation of 
wildlife in the Antarctic. He wrote that at the SCAR meeting in 1960 Roberts 
had decided that something had to be done about conservation. Roberts 
invited Holdgate to work on the first draft of the Agreed Measures in the 
autumn of 1960 and assured Holdgate (a member of the first SCAR Working 
Group in Biology) "you write them and I'll negotiate them" (personal 
communication 1997). Documentary evidence from the time serves to confirm 
that Holdgate himself wrote the first draft of what became the Agreed 
Measures supporting his statement that "we were definitely working on what 
became the Agreed Measures in the Autumn of 1960" (personal 
communication 1997). 
The evening before 11 July, Roberts discussed the issue privately with Dr. 
Reynolds, a senior member of the United States delegation. Roberts 
concluded that "We seem to be in agreement about the need for a wildlife 
conservation, but not at all on how this can best be achieved - by simple 
agreement, covenant or convention". 21 
Roberts believed that this uncontroversial subject could have wide popular 
appeal and could convey the idea that the Treaty was more "than a mere 
device to stop bickering over sovereignty".22 Once again he reiterated the 
24 
British objective of initiating common legislation for the whole of the Treaty 
area to be enacted by an international authority which would be endowed 
with power to make laws on this and other matters. 
However, on 12 July, during an informal discussion with the New Zealanders, 
it became clear that Roberts' worry that the Canberra Meeting had too little 
time in which to get anywhere near agreement on an ideal statute, had firm 
foundation.23 Robertson, of New Zealand, assured the British that he could 
not agree to anything which committed his country, even to consider a draft to 
be discussed at the next meeting. He-was not authorised, he said, to approve 
anything of which a draft had not already been thrashed out in Washington.24 
This represented the -first cracks that appeared within the unified 
commonwealth countries' approach to the first Consultative Meeting. On the 
same day, the British and the Australians informally presented their agreed 
views to the Americans. The American delegation, however, was only 
prepared to discuss their own draft Recommendation. George Owen, the 
head of the US delegation, would not discuss British proposals on the 
grounds that they had not been tabled in their present form at the Interim 
Consultative Group meetings in Washington.25 At this point, it became clear 
to Roberts that it would be a major task to win acceptance of anything which 
had not already been tentatively agreed in Washington.26 
On 14 July, Roberts and Arthur Watts redrafted British ideas, avoiding the 
word 'Convention' and substituting this for the word 'proposals'. This 
represented a watering down of British objectives and did not differ in 
substance from American proposals. It was designed to win American 
approval but Owen still seemed unwilling to consider it.27 Talks with the 
Chileans suggested that they would Hke a draft 'Convention' but both parties 
realised that this could not be agreed before the second Consultative 
Meeting.28 
On 17 July, formal negotiations on conservation began, and two days later a 
draft for submission to the full conference was agreed upon which included a 
provision that the British proposals · should be in the agenda for the next 
Consultative meeting.29 As an interim measure it was recommended that 
general rules of conduct should be issued along the lines of SCAR's 
recommendations. Roberts believed that the British would now "have to go 
more slowly than I had hoped. Although our idea of a Convention has wide 
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support, especially from the Chileans, it has been blocked by the 
Americans". 30 
C. THE SECRETARIAT - FIRST ANTARCTIC TREATY CONSULTATIVE 
MEETING, CANBERRA 1961. 
"Perhaps the most important issue discussed in Canberra was the question of 
administrative arrangements. Before the Meeting, Australia made it known it 
wanted a permanent secretariat headquarters in Canberra, manned by 
Australian Foreign Office personnel : As the proposal circulated, Argentina, 
Chile and the Soviet Union doubted the need for a secretariat. They preferred 
to continue the Washington interim meetings, chiefly because all Consultative 
Powers were represented there with staff knowledge on Antarctic issues" 
(Myhre 1984: 121). 
The primary sources below cast doubt upon the substance of Myhre's final 
sentence. 
In section A of this chapter it was explained that three of the Commonwealth 
countries had informally concerted their views on a Secretariat prior to the 
Canberra meeting. On 8 July 1961, the British again shared informal talks 
with the Australians and established close relations with them.31 On the same 
day the British tried to establish a similar relationship with the American 
delegation, but the result was unexpected and depressing.32 In particular, 
Owen refused to discuss anything which had not already been discussed at 
Washington.33 Roberts believed that the delegation had been plunged into a 
series of cold war arguments which in his opinion were not relevant in the 
Antarctic. When questioned about a Secretariat, Owen asserted that the 
United States di~ not want one and hoped that Washington would be the 
repository of all agreements reached under the Treaty. When asked whether 
he would like a Treaty Secretariat to be in Washington, Owen indicated that 
nothing else would be acceptable to the United States delegation. 
On 9 July the British redrafted their original proposals for a technical group to 
advise the Secretariat and presented this to the Australian, American, New 
Zealand and South African delegations. Roberts believed some focal point 
for the Treaty Powers was undoubtedly necessary.34 It is claimed that it was 
not possible to reach an agreement on this during the framing of the Treaty. 
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In the early life of the Treaty there could be no executive function for a 
Secretariat; Roberts believed it would act as a 'post office' for the exchange 
of information between governments.35 Roberts foresaw a one-man part-time 
body with Government 'X' providing a Permanent Secretary and being free to 
nominate different officials for the task of Secretary from time to time. The 
meetings of such a group would be held in various capitals in rotation and the 
host government would provide the Secretariat and associated services for 
the duration of each meeting, and meet all the common expenses of each 
meeting.36 
The British believed they could agree to the concept of a small Secretariat as 
favoured by the Australians if there was a clear majority in favour of it. The 
Australians advocated a permanent Secretariat in Canberra along the lines of 
the Colombo Plan Bureau,37 which had been created in 1950 to promote the 
development of newly independent Asian member countries (Paxton 
1988:50). 
The British rejected the Chilean proposal of a rotating Secretary, preferring a 
permanent Secretary in one location. The American proposal that the Interim 
Consultative Group might become permanent was rejected on the grounds 
that a permanent Committee of the Article IX group was ill-equipped to 
perform the purely administrative tasks of a permanent Secretariat, and likely 
to attract political discussion to matters which should be dealt with as 
practical matters by bodies such as SCAR.38 
In addition, the British proposed a body to deal with political and technical 
matters from which SCAR should be distanced. The British believed that this 
advisory group would have a technological advisory function as well as an 
arm investigating the potentialities for economic developments. Roberts 
believed that the Secretariat would be best placed in Canberra, while the 
advisory body should be in Washington, given that SCAR was located in 
Cambridge.39 
During the evening of 13 July, Roberts had an informal conversation with 
Admiral Panzarini of Argentina (a chief advisor to the delegation and the 
Director of the Argentine Antarctic Institute), who said that he was very 
anxious to co-operate but would have trouble persuading the leader of his 
delegation, Senor Scilingo who had come with personal instructions from the 
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President of Argentina, Frondizi.40 Scilingo had been instructed to prevent 
either Washington or Canberra becoming the headquarters of the Treaty. In 
Roberts' opinion, given the unanimity rule, this would not be a difficult task. 41 
Although the plenary session of 12 July had addressed the question of a 
Secretariat under the uncontroversial title "Administrative Matters", it was not 
until 19 July that objections to the Anglo-Australian initiative were forcefully 
aired. The Chileans spoke strongly against the establishment of any form of 
executive authority for the Treaty and advocated the rotating Secretariat 
principle to be organised by the hosr country for each following Consultative 
Meeting.42 The French, similarly, argued against "bureaucratisation", 
preferring bilateral arrangements between governments. The Argentines and 
the Americans then blocked any discussion of the proposed British practical 
measures.43 On 20 July, the Norwegians, New Zealanders and South 
Africans expressed the wish to accept the Australian temporary secretarial 
facilities as an interim measure but expressed a desire to avoid a "supra 
national government". The US argued that a Secretariat would be premature 
and that recommendations should be communicated to them (the depositary 
government) so that they could inform other governments. The Soviet 
delegation also argued against a Secretariat and in favour of using normal 
diplomatic channels between meetings.44 
Showing the sensitivity of this matter in relation to continued problems arising 
out of the sovereignty issue, and in deference to the Latin Americans, the 
matter was referred to as "procedural arrangements" from that point on. The 
British had long before realised that agreement on a permanent Secretariat 
was out of the question and therefore attempted a majority in favour of a 
temporary secretariat in Canberra.45 Having blocked Chilean proposals but 
having not secured unanimous support for Canberra, the best the British 
could hope for was a postponement of the whole issue.46 
The conference Secretariat then prepared a draft which the British saw as 
dangerous due to its last paragraph, which would have allowed the 
Americans to achieve their object: namely that consultation between 
Consultative Meetings should be in Washington and that governments' 
notification of their acceptance of Recommendations at Consultative 
Meetings should be communicated to the depositary government (US), who 
would then inform other governments.47 This proposal was supported by 
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Chile, France and the USSR with the Australians and British in disagreement, 
and no conclusion was reached at this stage.48 
Later in the day the Soviet delegation reiterated that they would be supportive 
of using either normal diplomatic channels or the depository government, 
while Owen repeated his support of the latter procedure. He asserted that this 
was purely a legal matter and had nothing to do with administrative 
arrangements. Roberts, however, having had informal talks with Owen, 
believed that his statements were not based on legal considerations but 
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"represented a step in his plan to get an embryo Treaty Secretariat in 
Washington ... Eventually, we achieved a draft which leaves the door open for 
the next Consultative Meeting to reconsider the whole question without 
commitment". 49 
D. TELECOMMUNICATIONS FIRST ANT ARCTIC TREATY 
CONSULTATIVE MEETING, CANBERRA 1961. 
In 1961, while on 'Operation Deep Freeze', Roberts had informal talks with 
E.A. Macdonald (Captain, US Navy, Deputy Commander Task Force 43) and 
J. Tierney (Hydrographic Office, NSF representative on expedition who had 
spent six seasons in the Antarctic), they "share my view that 
communications ... cannot be suitably dealt with by SCAR".50 
This followed a similar discussion late in 1960 with Law, who became the 
senior Australian advisor at the first Consultative Meeting. On this occasion, 
Law stated that he opposed the opinion of his foreign office seniors in 
Canberra that radio communications should be the responsibility of the 
proposed Secre~ariat rather than SCAR (which it was at that time). He 
favoured SCAR for the telecommunications subject solely because the 
existing arrangements worked and he could not see them being handled 
satisfactorily by a political Secretariat in Canberra. However, at this point he: 
"Agreed at once that a technical group ... could more appropriately deal with 
such matters and report to the Article IX group through the Secretariat". 51 
These two pieces of evidence point to the conclusion that at the start of 1961 
British thinking on the telecommunications question was linked to the idea of 
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a Secretariat with a technical arm able to deal with political questions from 
which SCAR had to be distanced. 
The issue of telecommunications is significant because between 1959 and 
1964 this issue allowed the Contracting Parties to explore the efficacy of 
Article IV of the Treaty. Article IV froze the sovereignty question for the 
duration of the Treaty, but it was generally understood that Article IV had 
been the lowest common denominator of agreements and that confidence 
had to be built between the Contracting Parties if Article IV and the Treaty 
were to survive in the long term. In this way one can see how the question of 
communications was linked to the British strategy of strengthening the 
Antarctic Treaty against its perceived weaknesses. 
If one considers that within two days of arriving in Canberra, Roberts had 
concluded that it would be virtually impossible to create a permanent 
Secretariat at that meeting, then it is reasonable to conclude that the British 
position on telecommunications would have to change. It is also important to 
bear in mind the sentiment in the United Kingdom general brief drafted in 
June 1961: "It is vital both that SCAR should be kept right outside political 
questions and at the same time that no machinery should be set up which will 
interfere with or unnecessarily duplicate the practical work which SCAR [is] 
successfully performing" .52 
It is clear from the evidence below that due to the failure to reach agreement 
on a permanent Secretariat, the British were left with little hope of being able 
to positively advance the question of telecommunications in the way that had 
been clearly envisaged by Roberts (during his conversation with Law) in 1960 
and that this left them with one option on the question of telecommunications 
which was not an entirely satisfactory solution. 
The SCAR mandate was to advise on the practical aspects of communication 
within the Antarctic and between the Antarctic and the rest of the world.53 In 
Roberts' opinion there were two main advantages in leaving this arrangement 
undisturbed. The fi rst was that communications were vital to the success of 
the scientific programme and that a change of responsibility might prejudice 
this. The second was that international agreement on the practical problems 
associated with the question might be easier to achieve through the small 
and personal machinery of SCAR rather than more cumbersome inter-
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governmental machinery. Importantly, however, Roberts accepted that if this 
were to happen: "many administrative decisions, some of them with political 
implications, have to be taken if a marked improvement in radio 
communications is to be achieved, and SCAR is not really a suitable body to 
do this".s4 
Therefore, on balance, despite the general desirability of not creating new 
machinery to deal with matters being handled by SCAR, the British were 
forced to support the Australian proposal to set up an inter-governmental 
committee to deal with radio communications which also had US. support.ss 
Roberts gave three cave~ts to his support. First, any recommendation should 
provide for close consultation with SCAR in order that a smooth transfer of 
responsibilities could be achieved. Second, existing arrangements should not 
be disturbed until after the SCAR meeting of October 1962 in Wellington. 
Third, the British wanted SCAR and the WMO (World Meteorological 
Organisation) to be represented on the proposed committee and also the ITU 
(International Telecommunications Union) to be represented as the occasion 
demanded.s6 
The British regarded the New Zealand position - that the ITU should be asked 
to deal with the Antarctic as a special area - as inappropriate and impractical 
due to it not being able to take the kind of executive action needed in these 
circumstances. While the British understood that the WMO played an 
important part in Antarctic radio communications, due to meteorological 
traffic, they believed it was important not to forget the scientific and 
administrative importance of Antarctic radio communication. Therefore, the 
British believed that the WMO should not be allowed to play a leading role.s7 
The Plenary Session approved the Working Group draft recommendation on 
Radio Communications. The result was unsatisfactory for the British who had 
wished to align telecommunications with the plans f<?r a technical arm of the 
Secretariat and to therefore positively advance the Treaty and the question of 
telecommunications in the Antarctic . . It was not possible to avoid the proposal 
that telecommunications should be the subject of a special .meeting to be 
sponsored by the governments.sa In the British opinion, this was 
unsatisfactory because it would simply duplicate the work already being done 
efficiently by SCAR, thereby breaking one of the British objectives as laid 
down in the general brief. In these circumstances, Roberts concluded that 
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"SCAR will have no alternative but to continue its working group on 
Communications."59 
Thus, it is clear that prior to the meeting the British had clear ideas as to how 
to move the question of telecommunications positively forward. In the course 
of negotiations it became obvious that the British would have to acquiesce, to 
some extent, on the matter of telecommunications. SCAR could not be asked 
to deal with political questions that would arise from the discussion of the 
matter. The subject was likely to provoke fears over sovereignty due to the 
traditional way that the telecommunication function had been addressed 
throughout the world. A government agency had usually been required to 
look after licensing and it-was probable that if this principle was extended to 
communications in the Antarctic then questions of sovereignty which, in the 
British opinion, had only been partially laid to rest by the Treaty would be 
opened up with potentially damaging consequences. Equally, it was 
undesirable given the territorial sovereignty ramifications of the issue that the 
international bodies WMO and ITU should be allowed to play too central a 
role. Given the circumstances, it was an inevitable outcome that the British 
should want to influence this debate negatively by attempting to stall any 
progression towards an inter-governmental radio communications committee 
centred around the WMO or the ITU. 
E. BRITISH CONCLUSIONS ON THE FIRST ANTARCTIC TREATY 
CONSULTATIVE MEETING, CANBERRA 1961. 
Roberts wrote after the conclusion of the Canberra meeting that it had been 
an opportunity for the 12 governments to demonstrate how far they were 
unanimously preP.ared to go in furthering the provisions of the Treaty.60 In his 
report to the Foreign Secretary, Robin Edmonds (the head of the British 
delegation in Canberra) wrote that the paradox of the meeting had been the 
contrast between the attitudes of the Soviet and the ,American delegations.61 
According to Edmonds, the former bent over backwards to be conciliatory and 
on the rare occasions when they found themselves out on a limb, they 
withdrew with good grace.62 Edmonds asserted that the US delegation was 
led nominally by their Ambassador in Canberra but effectively by Owen, Head 
of the Antarctic Office in the State Department. Edmonds continued: 
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"Before the meeting opened, Mr. Owen took the line that his brief was 
unalterable on the grounds that other governments had 18 months to put their 
views in Washington and that it was now too late to suggest any new ideas 
which might require a modification of the United States Delegation 
instructions" .63 
Edmonds conceived of there being two reasons for this attitude. First, the US 
may have feared that the Soviets were attempting to gain a Cold War 
advantage through the meeting. This-is supported by Owen's remark that if a 
Secretariat were to be established the Soviets would inevitably attempt to 
make a Troika out of it _in time.64 Second, Edmonds propounded the view 
supported by Roberts that "personal ambition had played a large part in 
determining Mr. Owen's behaviour". 65 
Whatever the reason for the US position at the meeting, Roberts' diary and 
the official Foreign Office report make it clear that the British had only been 
partially successful in achieving their aims due to unimaginative stand taken 
by many delegations with regard to the development of the Treaty as a 
system. The Latin American approach was exceedingly cautious, while the 
Norwegian, French , Belgian and Japanese interests were marginal.66 On the 
other hand the UK, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were broadly at 
one in hoping to secure agreement on detailed measures to give practical 
effect to Treaty provisions67 and therefore as a rule the British were able to 
mobilise a majority.68 
On the preservation and conservation of living resources in the Antarctic, 
Edmonds wrote that "looking to the future, this was perhaps the most 
encouraging recommendation passed by this meeting".69 
The meeting recommended that, as an interim measure, governments should 
issue rules of conduct along the lines of SCAR's recommendations and 
consult "on the form in which it would be most su itable to establish in due 
course internationally agreed measures ... taking into account .. . the documents 
submitted to the First Consultative Meeting". Edmonds pointed out that the 
documents included a United Kingdom draft "prepared in a form which would 
be suitable for an international convention, but deliberately avoided using the 
word 'convention' , which would have frightened a number of delegations".70 
Here one can conclude that the British objective of wildlife conservation was 
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moving in the right direction but that its path would be slower than originally 
conceived if the long-term benefits of strengthening the Treaty were to be 
achieved. 
Roberts wrote that by far the most difficult subject was that concerning 
administrative arrangements (the Secretariat).71 He admitted that it became 
clear from the outset that the British objective, the permanent Secretariat, was 
unobtainable. He added "most delegations admitted privately the need for 
permanent machinery of some kind, but for varying motives none was 
prepared to do so publicly except ourselves".72 
Edmonds concurred with- Roberts that this left no option but to postpone the 
issue and to take no decision which prejudged it in any way.73 With this in 
mind, British tactics were concerted with the Australians throughout.74 The 
first step was to form a majority in favour of a temporary Secretariat in 
Canberra, the second was to block a Chilean initiative of a rotating 
Secretariat. Edmonds asserted that "We succeeded in doing this ... [and] the 
rest of our and the Australian efforts had largely to be devoted to preventing 
the Americans from achieving their object which they sought to do by 
proposing that consultation between meetings should be in Washington and 
the Governments "notification of their acceptance of recommendations put 
forward by consultative meetings should be communicated to the United 
States Government, as the depository government under the Treaty, which 
would then inform other governments of such acceptances".75 
Edmonds stated that during the defeat of this proposal "Owen appeared to 
take his defeat very much to heart".76 He concluded by asserting that in order 
to save American face, the Australians devised an interim formula which 
incorporated some ideas of using the depository government but on a lesser 
scale than that anticipated by Owen. Edmonds concluded this topic by stating 
that "recommendation 14 ... is drafted in such a way which obliges the next 
Consultative Meeting to face the whole question again" .77 Roberts added to 
these conclusions by stating that recommendation 14 provided the "basic 
minimum of administrative services divided between Buerios Aires and 
Canberra ... We are therefore free to pursue our objective at the next 
Consultative Meeting".78 
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On the question of Roberts' initiative for a technical advisory arm of a 
Secretariat that could tackle politically sensitive issues from which SCAR 
should be distanced, Edmonds believed that "The time was not ripe for 
launching publicly the idea of an Antarctic Technical Advisory Group. Had we 
done so at this meeting, we should have killed the idea stone dead".79 
Edmonds made no reference to radio communications in his despatch save 
for a short paragraph which mentioned the recommendation that meetings of 
experts were required in order to consider the urgent problem of Antarctic 
Radio communications. At this meeting, it could be argued that the British 
placed more emphasis on Recommendations 9 and 12, namely the 
preservation of historic s~tes and co-operation in mail services. Both of these 
items had overtones pertaining to the sovereignty question and Edmonds 
condoned the tabling of these issues as being in accordance with the general 
brief which had called for risking controversy rather than permitting 
emasculated recommendations. Edmonds admitted that efforts on both of 
these items were in part wasted because: "we aroused Latin American 
suspicions and met with a negative attitude from the Americans, who actually 
tabled in their name our own Interim Group resolution on mail services".80 
Roberts makes it clear that the unanimity rule and the context of the meeting 
made it impossible for the British delegation to raise all the points that they 
would have wished. He refers to "other business" that the British had and "will 
have to be tackled at some future date".81 This "other business" puts some 
meat on the Roberts proposition that the British had a clear long-term agenda 
for the region. It is clear from the "other business" that questions of 
"inspection", "jurisdiction" and "exploitation of economic resources" would 
have featured heavily if the British had been allowed to air their "other 
business".82 These questions all pertain to the difficult issue of sovereignty, 
which the three issues that have been highlighted in th is chapter also do. 
One can reasonably draw the conclusion that British long term interests for 
the region centred on the question of sovereignty which the British delegation 
clearly felt was not properly addressed by the Washington Conference and 
the subsequent Treaty. The long-term objective of an international regime for 
the region was not simply rhetoric (see appendix 2), for Roberts' brief dated 5 
July 1961 contained in Appendix C extracts from the original United Kingdom 
draft for an international regime in Antarctica.83 This is a most interesting 
document, showing the forward-thinking proposals that were emanating from 
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the British during the period. The draft convention not only provided for an 
Antarctic administration but also a legislature and a judicial system. The 
British foresaw both a Supreme Court and a constabulary for the continent. 84 
While one could argue that this thinking was na'ive given the unanimity rule 
and the objectives of other Contracting Parties it shows the depth and the 
extent of the progressive planning that existed in Britain, the most obvious 
public expression from which in 1961 was the initiative on the convention for 
the preservation of Antarctic wildlife. 
Edmonds concluded that the British would have to reconsider their long-term 
policy for the region. Given the results of the meeting, Edmonds suggested 
that the British needed to decide whether they should continue to push hard 
for measures pointing towards internationalisation of the Antarctic. If the 
British chose to continue with their long-term objectives, Edmonds believed 
that the British first call should be on the State Department in order to 
prepare a common line before Buenos Aires. Edmonds clearly saw Owen as 
a stumbling block and suggested that in light of the differences encountered 
at the meeting "we might go over Mr. Owen's head and discuss our 
differences with his Under-Secretary, Mr. Cleveland".85 
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CHAPTER 3 
BRITISH INFLUENCE ON THE SECOND ANTARCTIC TREATY 
CONSULTATIVE MEETING, BUENOS AIRES 1962 
A. BRITISH OBJECTIVES 
"A year after the Canberra Meeting, the Consultative Powers met. For some 
reason, the intervening period does not appear to have been put to much 
constructive use; many -of the delegations were inadequately prepared." 
(Myhre 1986: 48) 
In the case of the British delegation, the above statement is without 
foundation. As suggested by Edmonds, Lord Hood (British Minister in 
Washington) met with Mr. Cleveland (Assistant Secretary International 
Affairs) before the Buenos Aires meeting in order to iron out Anglo-American 
disagreements. Owen was present and advanced his usual arguments, but in 
Hood's opinion Cleveland did not seem disposed to accept them without 
giving them thought. 86 On the question of a Secretariat, Cleveland said that 
the American approach had hitherto been a practical one, dependent on 
saved expenditure and avoiding acrimonious discussion between the 
contracting parties. He promised to give thought to the idea that within ten 
years a real international regime for Antarctica might be possible and that 
Consultative Meetings should start to move in that direction from that point 
on .a? 
A general brief by Anthony Parsons ( of the Foreign Office American 
department), dated June 1962, for the guidance of the British delegation at 
Buenos Aires asserts that the British had conducted an extensive lobbying 
operation culminating in exchanges of view at the , preliminary meetings in 
Buenos Aires.88 The general outlook, he insisted, was not encouraging, the 
discussions with the South Americans not being as fruitful as the British had 
hoped. The Frondizi government had fallen in Argentina, leaving their 
Antarctic specialist Dr. Guyer in a precarious position. Equally, the Chilean 
expert Dr. Gajardo had been fully occupied with the Rio Lauca dispute.89 
Once again the British had been concerting their views closely with all three 
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Commonwealth states, but "at the last moment, however, the New Zealand 
government have tabled a recommendation that future consultations between 
consultative meetings should take place in Washington". 90 
The British saw this as playing into American hands and believed that any 
chance of creating a Secretariat in Canberra would be lost if this was allowed 
to stand.91 Also, the Soviet Union came out strongly against a permanent 
Secretariat at the last preliminary meeting in Buenos Aires, thereby 
hampering British objectives. 
It was noted in Parsons' brief notes that discussions with the French in the 
Quai D'Orsay went well but that the final preliminary meeting "proved that the 
French cannot be relied upon when it comes to the point". Once again 
Norway, Belgium and Japan were said to have been sympathetic to the 
British view. 
The brief insisted that the recommendations passed in Canberra were 
anodyne.92 The British believed that co-operation under the Treaty was no 
further forward than at the time it was signed in 1959.93 The brief therefore 
stated that the Second Consultative Meeting would be of crucial importance 
for the development of the Antarctic Treaty. The British delegation were 
instructed that: 
"the general aim should be the same as at Canberra, namely to bring about 
whatever progress may be possible in the direction of a truly international 
regime in the Antarctic. The delegation should not, however, 'risk controversy 
rather than permit emasculated recommendations'". 94 
This represente~ a change in the British approach which at that point 
attached importance to avoiding giving the impression that they were trying to 
hurry other governments. Parsons' brief called for the translation of this policy 
into three objectives. First, support should be given to the two Australian 
resolutions (due to the close nature of the Anglo-Australian relationship) on 
the items concerning the exchange of military information and action on 
recommendations put forward at consultative meetings. Second, extensive 
lobbying was to be undertaken in order to move forward the two 
recommendations tabled by the British. The first covered jurisdiction, the 
second recommendation covered the draft convention on the conservation of 
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wildlife. 95 The Delegation were instructed to fall back on a Chilean proposal 
to study the possibility of an international convention if the British proposal 
proved impossible to proceed with. Third, Parsons' brief suggested that the 
question of the Secretariat was likely to be the most important subject at the 
meeting. The Delegation was given as free a hand as possible but was not to 
alter Canberra recommendation XIV without reference to the Foreign Office 
for instructions.96 
B. THE CONSERVATION OF WILDLIFE - SECOND CONSULTATIVE 
MEETING, BUENOS AIRES 1962 -
It quickly became clear that the stumbling block would not be the principle 
that wild-life was conserved, rather the form that such an agreement would 
take. Garjardo, the Chilean, informally preferred a code rather than a 
convention due to the constitutional difficulties a convention would encounter 
in Chile. During formal discussion, the Belgian, French and Norwegian 
representatives all favoured a convention. The Japanese believed that a 
convention would be possible after a meeting of experts. The South Africans, 
while supporting the idea of a convention, believed a code to be more 
suitable whilst the Australians foresaw no difficulty in a convention if it should 
prove to be the general wish of the meeting97. The Argentines, however, while 
expressing agreement with the need for wild-life conservation, suggested that 
a set of agreed rules or regulations might be the way to handle the matter98. 
Owen, for the United States, supported a meeting of experts to discuss the 
form of any agreed recommendation, which he believed was the sticking 
point99. The French suggested that this might prove too costly, and the Soviet 
delegates said that they were ready to recommend a draft convention to their 
government. 
Owen repeated several times that the Contracting Parties had only received 
the UK Draft Convention less than three weeks before the meeting, and that 
this was too short a time in which to consult experts., Robin Edmonds, for the 
British, asserted that this final draft differed little from the document circulated 
at Canberra in 1961 and simply represented refinements that now took the 
form of a formal convention rather than the previous proposals but that 
everyone at Canberra had understood that the British had aimed at a 
convention. 100 Privately, Owen informally questioned the whole need for 
internationally agreed measures for the Antarctic.101 
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It seems at this point, on 24 July, that relations between the British and 
American delegations were at their most strained. Roberts questioned 
whether in these circumstances the British could hope to achieve much 
political co-ordination in the region, of the sort that SCAR achieved with the 
American scientist Crary, while Owen continued to hold his present post. This 
followed a heated formal discussion between Edmonds and Owen, during 
which the latter had asserted that nothing could be agreed at this meeting 
because the British had failed to discuss details in advance with the State 
Department in Washington. Edmonds replied that the British had made every 
effort to do so and that the Americans had had the substance of the draft 
convention for more than a year, which was well within the prescribed time 
limit, but that "it takes two to make a discussion possible" .102 
Roberts believed that Owen, the policy maker, was as uncertain about the 
future of the Antarctic as the British had been in 1952. He believed that he 
was still thinking along orthodox nationalistic lines in an attempt to postpone 
any irrevocable decision which might in later years prove a disadvantage to 
the United States.103 Roberts believed that Owen did not regard the Treaty as 
"a wonderful opportunity for bold experimentation in a new kind of 
international regime without risk of damaging the interests of the local 
population. I am tempted to speculate further and to suggest that George 
[Owen] still believes that he is an instrument of the 'manifest destiny' of the 
United States as the controlling influence in future Antarctic Affairs" .104 
Roberts believed that the United States could have quite easily taken over 
the leading role in the region but had not chosen to do so except in a material 
way. Further, he believed that -:"they [the US] can lead, but they cannot 
dominate; still less can they expect agreement when they attempt crude 
dictation of their views. The inevitable result is the stalemate in which we now 
flounder" .105 
The differences between the British and American delegations over the 
scientific substance of the convention on the conservation of wildlife were 
raised on 25 July. Owen asserted informally that one of his objections to the 
British proposals concerned the acceptance of the idea of absolute 
sanctuaries and the effect this could have on inspection provisions.106 
Freeland had attempted to insert the words "subject to the provision of Article 
VII of the Antarctic Treaty" in order to meet this point. 107 The British knew 
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from Hood's meeting with Cleveland that Owen was against the idea of 
sanctuaries, and on that occasion Hood gave the false impression that the 
British had no "preconceived ideas on sanctuaries as opposed to other 
solutions" .108 The problem stemmed from the fact that the US believed no 
agreement could be reached on the need for nature reserves or sanctuaries 
until a precise list had been produced with accurately defined boundaries. 
Roberts, whose scientific field concerned Antarctic birds, believed that the 
problem could not be settled by producing a scheduled list of species of 
which there were many about which science knew practically nothing, and 
which could not be identified by anyone but a specialist. In his opinion this 
would be similar to being asked to choose a wine before one could look at the 
wine list.109 
Freeland, who had been looking at South American objections to a 
convention, believed that the British should aim for a recommendation of the 
next Consultative Meeting. This was to have an agreed code annexed to it 
and was to recommend to governments that they accept the code. The code 
would include a provision enabling it to enter into effect and become binding 
when it had been accepted by all the Contracting Parties to the Treaty who 
participated in Consultative Meetings, thus circumventing parliamentary 
approval of the text. 110 The final outcome on 26 July was the approval of the 
draft recommendation agreed by the working group. The Australians formally 
stated that they would agree to this reluctantly, while the Argentine delegate 
asserted that his government could not approve a convention. Freeland 
emphasised that the British were concerned with achieving an internationally 
binding instrument rather than the precise form of the instrument itself. Once 
again, for the moment, the British objective had been unsuccessful and 
Roberts concluded that "It is unfortunate that we have had to agree to this 
compromise, but there may be one advantage in dropping the idea of a 
Convention ... we should surely have to wait for many years before their (Chile 
and Argentina) parliaments are willing to ratify it" .111 
C. JURISDICTION - SECOND CONSULTATIVE MEETING, BUENOS 
AI RES, 1962 
The British linked the question of jurisdiction in the Antarctic to the long-term 
objective of internationalisation of the region. In many ways jurisdiction can 
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be seen as part of the conservation/Secretariat package that would in the 
long term, the British hoped, move the internationalisation debate forward. 
Roberts had written at the first conference that "this question of jurisdiction is 
clearly going to be difficult".112 Unlike questions of conservation and 
administration, the British knew from the outset that this subject was of 
sufficient weight as to make short-term discussion very difficult for those 
countries who wished not to discuss matters relating to sovereignty. Despite 
being under parliamentary obligation to raise the matter at the First 
Consultative Meeting, the Foreign Office had instructed the Delegation to 
remain silent on the subject, and to give notice in the closing speech that the 
UK would wish to discuss the matter at Buenos Aires. 113 Appendix B to a brief 
on item 21 (other business) in Canberra, makes reference to the fact that the 
British had put forward a draft Article relating to jurisdiction at the Washington 
Conference but had been unable to reach an agreement on the matter. 11 4 It is 
clear therefore that the question of jurisdiction was another subject 
unresolved, in British minds, by the Antarctic Treaty. 
One of the stated objectives of the British brief prior to Buenos Aires was to 
achieve a recommendation calling for the question of jurisdiction to be 
studied by a committee of experts. 115 Additionally, Article IX 1 (e) of the 
Treaty expressly included "questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in 
Antarctica" to be one of the subjects to be discussed at Consultative 
Meetings. Roberts explained on 18 July (the day the Meeting was officially 
inaugurated) that the satisfactory settlement of matters of jurisdiction was 
important . to the realisation of British policy of internationalisation of the 
Antarctic for two reasons. First, it encouraged positive co-operation, which in 
Roberts' opinion was essential for internationalisation. Second, and more 
important in Roberts' view, it would avoid the dangers inherent in a possible 
conflict over jurisdiction.11 6 Such a conflict could lead to acute problems 
concerning sovereignty and thus could disrupt the international spirit of the 
Treaty. 117 Roberts wrote that the idea of a convention for an international 
regime, while being an ideal solution, had largely been considered 
unworkable and that the British had now decided to work from the bottom up, 
thereby "gradually build[ing] up the jurisdictional prop to our main policy of 
internationalisation while at the same time not frightening other 
governments".118 It was hoped that a meeting of experts would keep the 
question alive, allowing the British to "educate the other governments".119 
42 
Due to the perceived sensitivity of the question, the British once more sought 
instructions from the Foreign Office in London. 
The Soviets joined with the Latin American and French representatives in 
opposing inscription of the item on the agenda. 12° Freeland gained the 
impression during informal discussion that the British were unlikely to make 
progress on this question if they continued to treat it in isolation. He was of 
the opinion that progress could be achieved if the British dealt with it 
incidentally, "in the context of practical measures such as those we propose 
on the conservation of wildlife". 121 With this in mind the British made the 
gesture of withdrawing the agenda item on 24 July while formally reserving 
the British position on the principle that a minority has no right to prevent 
discussion of any subject. Myhre has seen this as one of the significant 
moments of the second meeting, describing the blocking of this issue by 
certain countries as "contrary to the spirit of the Treaty and of co-operation 
that has historically existed in Antarctica"(1984: 125). Indeed, the US 
National Science Foundation made the point in their report that despite 
British reservations to the contrary this had set a precedent for, "if you object 
loudly enough in Antarctic Treaty discussions you can prevent discussion of 
an item"(NSF: 1962: 1 ). The British, however, did not see this as a defeat but 
rather as an opportunity to regroup and push the discussion of this matter in a 
more subtle manner. 
D. SECRETARIAT - SECOND ANTARCTIC TREATY CONSULTATIVE 
MEETING, BUENOS AIRES 1962 
Roberts believed that the most difficult but most important subject of all, as it 
was at Canberra, would be the question of a Secretariat. 122 The British brief 
for Buenos Aires dictated that a more subtle approach to this question was 
required, although the British delegation were under instructions from the 
Foreign Office that Canberra recommendation no. XIV should not be altered 
without reference back to the F.O for instruction. 123 . 
At the heart of British policy was the idea that the establishment of an embryo 
Secretariat in Canberra represented the only practical step that the British 
believed could be achieved at that stage in order to move towards some form 
of international regime in the Antarctic. On top of this principal long-term 
objective, the British were concerned that various delays and difficulties 
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which had arisen between Canberra and Buenos Aires could only be ironed 
out by such a mechanism, thereby ensuring the smooth running of the 
Treaty1 24. Roberts' fear was that the New Zealand proposal calling for all 
preparatory meetings to be held in a capital where New Zealand was 
represented, and preferably Washington, would "enhance the danger of the 
Cold War permeating the Treaty and vitiating its whole future" .125 The unified 
commonwealth approach to this question, which had existed at Canberra, 
appeared in jeopardy, although it seems that both Britain and Australia tried 
in vain to persuade the New Zealanders to withdraw their proposal before the 
preparatory meeting of 16 June.-126 
The maximum British objective for the meeting was to gain agreement in 
principle to the establishment of Canberra, or another agreed non-
controversial capital, as the permanent Secretariat, or failing this to persuade 
the New Zealanders to substitute Canberra for Washington. If the British 
were to find themselves in a minority over Washington, they were to oppose 
this on the grounds that a Southern Hemisphere capital was more appropriate 
and equally convenient. In the event of them being in a minority of one, new 
instructions were to be sought. 127 
There were two differences on this subject from Canberra that interested the 
British delegation. First, unlike the relaxed approach of the Soviet delegation 
at Canberra, at the Buenos Aires preparatory meeting the Soviet delegation 
strongly opposed the idea of any kind of Secretariat. The British delegation 
did not know the reason for this change. 128 The United States view, as voiced 
by Owen, which remained inflexibly in favour of Washington, as essentially 
the centre for an embryo Secretariat, was only one view in Washington, as 
revealed by Cleveland's attitude during talks with Hood. The British therefore 
believed that Owen would be inclined to listen to a more flexible attitude to 
the question of i~ternationalisation which clearly existed in Washington. 129 
Owen indicated informally that two schools of thought existed in Washington. 
First, there were those who believed that the Treaty ,had gone far enough in 
the internationalist direction, and, second, those (and Owen clearly believed 
that Cleveland was an adherent) who were convinced internationalists. It was 
indicated by Owen that the second school would like to see an Antarctic 
Commission established in some location other than Washington. 130 
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The New Zealand proposal gained support from Norway, Belgium and the 
US, who modified their previous position slightly by implying that they could 
accept meetings taking place in rotation around the twelve embassies in 
Washington rather than at the State Department. 131 
The British were uncompromisingly against the New Zealand proposal and 
explained that they did not wish to undo the Canberra recommendation, 
preferring instead to settle the problem at the next meeting.132 Chile largely 
agreed with this plan, though for reasons of preventing a consequent supra-
national government rather than initiating an international regime. The USSR 
and the Argentines also believed that the Canberra recommendation should 
be given more time and that it was premature to suggest any new procedure. 
The French opposed the New Zealand proposal on the grounds that 
"Parkinson's Law" might arise out of additional Antarctic bureaucracy, i.e. 
"that work would expand in order to fill the time available for its completion" 
(Economist 1955). The Japanese characteristically appeared willing to accept 
a general compromise on the matter.133 The Australian representative 
restated the need for a more effective means of implementing the Treaty and 
foresaw a time when ATCMs would be arranged in order to settle a question 
best handled by a committee of experts. In these circumstances, and in the 
case of records which needed to be exchanged between governments, he 
believed that a Secretariat would be essential. 134 The South Africans tended 
to support this view but preferred the centre of such a Secretariat to move 
from one capital to another, including the capitals of the smaller powers. 135 . 
E. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECOND ANTARCTIC TREATY 
CONSULTATIVE MEETING, BUENOS AIRES 1962 
In Canberra, the British had negatively influenced the question of 
telecommunications when it became apparent that their positive proposals on 
the matter had been overshadowed by their inability to gain acceptance of a 
permanent Secretariat. 
Before discussion of the matter began in Buenos Aires, the New Zealanders 
had accepted the British position that it would be politically unwise to press 
experts to agree to the de facto application of the International 
Telecommunications Convention in the Antarctic. At the time, countries 
operating in the Antarctic notified the ITU of the frequencies (save those 
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purely military frequencies) regardless of the territory in which they lay. The 
ITU convention laid down a "notification by territory" principle, and in Roberts' 
opinion this would raise the controversial issue of sovereignty, which some 
countries, especially the Latin Americans, were still not comfortable 
discussing. 136 
In 1962, the question had been complicated by the International Court of 
Justice's ruling over the Temple of Preah Vihear. This case concerned 
territory claimed by both Thailand and Cambodia. In 1930, Prince Damrong, 
formerly Minister of the Interior and anhe time President of the Royal Institute 
of Siam, visited the temple with the permission of the King of Siam on a visit 
that had quasi-official character (ICJ 1962 : 30).When he arrived at Preah 
Vihear, he was officially received there by the French Resident for the 
adjoining Cambodian province, on behalf of the Resident Superior, with the 
French flag flying. The court found in favour of Cambodian sovereignty for the 
region due to the fact that such Cambodian action demanded a reaction from 
Prince Damrong. Thailand, however, did nothing, and Damrong even sent 
pictures of his visit to the French Resident upon his return to Bangkok, 
admitting that France had acted as the host country (ICJ 1962: 30). This is all 
the more interesting due to the fact that one of the four judges ruling was Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, who had been British legal advisor at the Washington 
Conference. In this context, it is clear that any notification by territory could 
result in countries being forced to admit that their telecommunication 
installations were within the territory of the "host territory", thereby tacitly 
admitting the sovereignty of another country to the territory which for the 
purposes of the Treaty had been frozen. The British fear was that the 
mechanisms created by the Treaty were not strong enough, and more 
importantly, did not have full confidence of all the Contacting Parties to allow 
them to withstand such an incident. 
On the question of an international radio communications meeting, while the 
Americans had tentatively offered Washington as a venue for such a meeting, 
the British did not want to support any possible Australian suggestion that all 
members of the ITU should be invited to send representatives to such a 
meeting.137 It was the British opinion that the radio network iri the Antarctic 
had been set up by the participating nations and that only these 
representatives should attend, although the ITU and SCAR should be 
represented by observers. 138 
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The problem at Buenos Aires seems to have been one of arranging the 
precise date for a meeting of experts. The Soviets were vociferous in calling 
for a meeting immediately preceding the next Consultative Meeting. The 
British saw recommendation 11-111 as a compromise which provided for a 
government-sponsored · meeting of radio-communication specialists between 
1 May and 31 August 1963. The British believed this an unsatisfactory 
discussion of the issues, reflecting "the inefficiency of our present machinery 
to implement the treaty" .139 One again this sentiment relates to the original 
British intent of linking such politically sensitive questions to a technical arm 
of a proposed permanent Secretariat. Thus, the British were forced to agree 
informally with the Australians that if no decision on a date for the meeting 
had been reached within three months, the Australian government would take 
the initiative through diplomatic channels. Roberts restated the negative 
British position that had been forced upon them by discussions on the 
Secretariat in Canberra - "we, ourselves, do not wish to take any initiative in 
this matter because we believe (and have explained ad nauseam) that it can 
be dealt with most easily by the existing non-government SCAR Working 
Group, which need not invoke all the complications of the existing ITU 
arrangements" .140 
F. BRITISH CONCLUSIONS SECOND ANTARCTIC TREATY 
CONSULTATIVE MEETING, BUENOS AIRES 1962 
Myhre has commented in conclusion that, "the Second Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting was rather unglorious. Preparation was poor, and the 
Americans made it clear that meeting in Belgium would be pointless unless 
'full preparations for a useful and profitable meeting had been 
completed'"(1984: 131)(NSF 1962: 4). 
The British concluded similarly that, as had been expected, little progress 
was made at Buenos Aires. 141 The British, however, believed that the main 
obstacle to the United Kingdom policy of "putting teeth into the Treaty" was 
the continued opposition of the Latin American countries to any suggestion 
which cou ld affect their claims to territory in the area. Further, the British 
believed that any progress on the issue of full preparations for the meetings 
in the longer term depended on changing "the United States Government's 
insistence on Washington as the only possible Treaty centre" .142 
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George Middleton (the Head of the British delegation), writing a confidential 
dispatch to Lord Home (the Foreign Secretary), concluded that the twelve 
delegations held broadly the same position as they had done a year 
before.143 He believed that the Latin Americans were the chief obstacle to 
British objectives in the region and that off the record conversations with the 
Americans indicated that it could be worth pursuing the internationalist 
attitude. Equally, the French privately assured the British that they no longer 
had the same reservations about the question of jurisdiction and recognised 
that continuity between meetings had to be assured by some means. 144 
Regarding the two proposals submitted by the UK delegation, Middleton 
concluded that in the withdrawal of the item of jurisdiction from the agenda, 
the British gained a measure of sympathy by the decision not to press the 
question to a vote. At the same time the delegation made it clear this in no 
way altered Her Majesty's Government's view on the matter. Middleton also 
made the point that there was a clear majority in favour of tabling the item on 
jurisdiction.145 On the subject of wildlife conservation, Middleton asserted that 
"a clear majority of delegations also supported the United Kingdom proposal 
that an International Convention should be negotiated for the conservation of 
wildlife. Middleton laid the blame for the inability to achieve the favoured 
British result at the door of the Latin American countries due to sovereignty 
implications, and also the US delegation which "appeared unwilling to admit 
that the principle that Governments should accept binding commitments on 
this subject146." Middleton believed that Recommendation 11-11 was a 
compromise which did not guarantee that agreement would be reached at the 
next Consultative Meeting, but that "it is so worded that it will be 
embarrassing for Governments if they do not then agree on the text of 
internationally binding measures on this important subject" .147 Also, if this 
were to be the case, the recommendation would bind Governments to 
consider the United Kingdom draft Convention. 
Again, as with the official dispatch from Canberra, Middleton only briefly 
touched upon the issue of radio communications, preferring to concentrate on 
the New Zealand proposition concerning consultation between Consultative 
Meetings. Middleton admitted that Washington was not publicly 
acknowledged as the preferred venue for the embryonic Secretariat, but the 
New Zealanders made it clear that this was the capital they had in mind. It 
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was the United Kingdom's view that it was too early to consider breaking up 
the package deal achieved in Canberra, and, thus, the New Zealanders 
withdrew their proposal at the end of the debate. 148 The lack of progress on 
the substantive issue, namely the question of a Secretariat, was then linked 
by Middleton to Britain's long-term objectives for the region. Middleton 
expressed the belief that substantial progress in achieving long-term goals 
seemed to be limited at Consultative Meetings. In his opinion, "our general 
influence in Antarctic affairs is likely now to depend more on our physical 
effort on the ground".149 If the British could raise this, Middleton believed, 
then it would help to safeguard the -British position in the British Antarctic 
Territory, "a position which might otherwise be susceptible to rapid erosion if 
and when the Treaty comes to an end".150 Middleton also asserted that this 
raised level of activity would give the British a more powerful voice in 
Antarctic affairs, especially in the deliberations of the Antarctic Treaty 
powers. The question of sovereignty outside the zone of application was still 
a large issue for the British in relation to Antarctic Treaty policy, for as 
Middleton concluded, "anything more which we can do in the Antarctic will to 
some extent strengthen our position in the Falkland Islands and in the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies - a question which the Argentine Government 
have not forgotten, even though they are not pressing it actively at the 
present time" .151 
The last paragraph of the dispatch could be seen in two ways. Either one 
could believe that concerns outside the zone of application of the Treaty were 
playing a . large part in controlling British policy in the Treaty area, or one 
could take the attitude that this represented a request for heightened 
Whitehall interest in the area in general and that the most effective way of 
raising interest was to highlight the possibility of future conflict and therefore 
great expenditure. The comment by Roberts in his conclusions of the Buenos 
Aires meeting confirms the second of these suspicions as probably the most 
important. He wrote that the second meeting has made it clearer than ever 
that "in October and November this year we must ·initiate a review of our 
whole policy in the South Atlantic and go back to the Cabinet for decisions on 
a number of these" .152 Paragraph eight, it is claimed (the final paragraph of 
Middleton's dispatch) is designed to in itiate the idea in London of an 
increased level of activity in the region in order to safeguard British influence 
in Antarctic affairs. As well as new icebreakers, Roberts wanted to see 
decisions being taken on the future status of South Georgia and the South 
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Sandwich Islands, on new stamp issues for the British Antarctic Territory and 
on aligning BAS policy in London to the present attitudes and "probable 
activities of Argentina, Chile and the United States. 153 
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CHAPTER 4 
BRITISH INFLUENCE ON THE THIRD ANTARCTIC TREATY 
CONSULTATIVE MEETING, BRUSSELS 1964 
A. BRITISH OBJECTIVES 
A Foreign Office dispatch of 13 January 1964 reported that Sir George 
Middleton's fears (voiced in the official dispatch following the Buenos Aires 
meeting) that Britain had just about exhausted the possibilities of practical 
progress in the context of Antarctica for the time being, might be laid to rest 
by the third Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting. The reason for this change 
was "the encouraging progress which has been made ... by the somewhat 
fortuitous emergence of a successful centre for regular talks in Brussels" .154 
Held from March 1963 to May 1964, the ten preparatory meetings, initiated by 
the Belgian Government, concerned matters of substance and actual 
arrangements for the Brussels conference (Myhre 1984:133). The British 
believed that these meetings had been a constructive temporary addition to 
the Treaty machinery and had "developed into something more than the 
limited administrative gatherings which have taken place before previous 
consultative meetings" .155 Due to the unwillingness of some countries to 
upset the Canberra Recommendation I-XIV, the British believed that it was 
unlikely that the preparatory meetings would lead to any permanent 
arrangements being made for consultation between Consultative Meetings. 156 
The first preparatory meeting had set the tone for the last eight, (the final 
meeting concerned arrangements for the conference), with four major topics 
being covered. These were the date of the third meeting, the protection of 
Antarctic fauna and flora, the state of Antarctic telecommunications and the 
question of holding a governmental meeting on logistics (Myhre 1984: 133). 
Roberts asserted that during these preparatory meetings "it has been 
possible to negotiate a draft text on Agreed Measures on this [fauna and 
flora] subject. We have throughout taken the initiative on this matter and it is 
encouraging that we have been able to get so near to finding an acceptable 
form and text" .157 
In the introduction to his personal diary of the third Consultative Meeting, 




main subjects that the British had to direct itself to at the meeting. The second 
was the Anglo-Australian relationship, and Roberts believed that "we are at 
cross purposes with them on almost every subject" .158 He believed that this 
first became apparent at the Treaty meeting on telecommunications held in 
June 1963, but revealed "differences of opinion over the whole range of 
problems connected with the status of Treaty meetings" .159 The worry was 
that at the third meeting the British would not be able to avoid open conflict 
with the Australians. This was particularly prejudicial to the British long-term 
objective of internationalisation in the Antarctic, for the Australians had 
hitherto been stalwart allies over the need for a permanent Secretariat in 
Canberra. This position had not changed, but it is probable that difficulties 
with the Australians over-other Treaty subjects, coupled with the attitudes of 
the Latin Americans, dictated a new approach to progressive initiatives for the 
region being aired at such meetings. This is confirmed by Roberts who wrote 
of "the Treaty beginning to settle down to a humdrum existence" and this 
"being disappointing to those who look to it to provide a long-term 
international solution to the problems of the area" .160 
Roberts wrote of this being a period of "cooling down of discussions within 
the Treaty" and consequently the British believed that the Americans had a 
more flexible approach to Treaty questions, the most tangible change being 
the omission of Owen on the American delegation. The Foreign Office brief of 
January 1964 ordered that the British maintain such momentum as the Treaty 
had but "not to add to our reputation as Treaty busybodies" .161 With this in 
mind, Roberts wrote that a major objective at Brussels was the "desirability of 
limiting formal discussion of the controversial subjects which include 
Jurisdiction and the Secretariat" .162 Although internationalisation was still the 
long-term objective, the British did not now want to press the issues at the 
risk of offending other Participating nations. The British brief made it clear 
that the United Kingdom should still object to Washington as the centre of 
preparatory meetings as this would be "the first step towards making 
Washington the capital of the Antarctic and this would in turn expose the 
Treaty to Cold War pressures. Our opposition to centralising consultation on 
Washington would for the same reason apply equally to Moscow, London or 
Paris" .163 This is significant as the first occasion that the British had officially 
ruled out London as the centre for a permanent Secretariat, stressing the 
need to rectify relations with the Australians, given British preference for the 
Secretariat being situated in Canberra. 
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B. THE CONSERVATION OF WILDLIFE - THIRD CONSULTATIVE 
MEETING, BRUSSELS 1964. 
The British recognised before the Brussels meeting that "it will almost 
certainly be necessary to separate pelagic sealing into a separate agreement 
from that dealing with the problems of conservation on land" .164 This does not 
mean to say that the British were against a legally binding agreement on 
pelagic sealing. On the contrary, Roberts wrote that "I feel a strong urge not 
to postpone international discussions -merely because they are difficult ... If we 
must have all the complications of United Kingdom legislation, I think we 
should try to include all -the essential requirements of conservation" .165 By 
this, Roberts did not merely mean protection for seals, but internationally 
agreed measures for rational exploitation, with sufficient controls. The British 
felt that these mechanisms were required due to the probability of southern 
pelagic sealing by Norway and possibly Denmark beginning in the 1964-65 
season.166 
In the course of negotiations at the Third Meeting it became clear that the 
original British fear had foundation and that an international agreement on 
pelagic sealing would have to be delayed. Roberts believed that all 
delegations shared the desire to protect seals, but four main reasons 
inhibited agreement. First, there was a considerable problem related to rights 
on the high seas (at that time it was considered that this was too controversial 
a subject to raise at ATCMs). Second, the Russians wanted any agreement to 
be open to accession by any nation, a wish which was generally unpopular 
among other nations. Third, Roberts asserted that the Australians threatened 
to wreck the remaining issues under Agreed Measures unless pelagic sealing 
was satisfactorily covered. Fourth, the Norwegians were understandably 
reluctant to agree to any sealing restrictions unti l the results of their 
reconnaissance expedition south that year were known. 167 
Eventually, pelagic sealing was dropped almost completely from the Agreed 
Measures. The eventual compromise of Recommendation 111-XI was reached 
after both the Russians and the Norwegians had referred the draft back to 
their respective governments, after which they refused further discussion. 
Roberts believed that this compromise "satisfies no one, but in the 
circumstances nothing else was possible" .168 The question was therefore left 
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over for the next consultative meeting with Article X of the Agreed Measures 
providing the only basis for any regulation of sealing activity. The discussion 
of the issue of pelagic sealing under the auspices of the Agreed Measures is 
important in representing the positive will of the British to move forward both 
discussion and legislation, eventually leading to the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals (signed in 1972). 
The foundations for the successful passing of the Agreed Measures for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna were laid at the preparatory 
meetings in Brussels which preceded the Third Consultative Meeting. It was 
clear from these negotiations that any agreement on sealing would be difficult 
and that some countries -had widely differing views. At this point the British 
still held hope that an agreement could be reached on sealing as part of the 
Agreed Measures and even persuaded the Norwegian delegation that a 
clause could be inserted to allow sealing expeditions under permit. This was 
met at the Eighth preparatory meeting by the assertion by Cumes, the 
Australian head of delegation, that if animals or birds on floating ice outside 
territorial waters were not protected then "eighty per cent of the Agreed 
Measures would be nullified" .169 This raised the issue of rights on the high 
seas which the British had hoped to postpone until the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings were more stable. Roberts was able to question 
Cumes at the preparatory meeting and Cumes admitted that the Australian 
position had been prepared by Robert Carrick, the Australian biologist. 
Roberts asserted that these instructions made "no allowance for the practical, 
political or legal difficulties ... Most of it makes sense in the rather special 
context of Macquarie Island (outside the Treaty Area), but many of (these) 
arguments are hardly applicable south or on the other side of Antarctica" .170 
This example illustrates the problem of heads of delegations attempting to 
piece together internationally binding agreements while being required to 
argue from unalterable briefs prepared by scientists, who in turn, did not have 
adequate understanding of the political and legal difficulties. 
As far as the rest of the proposed Agreed Measures was concerned, it seems 
as though by the end of the Eighth Preparatory Meeting, the British had 
apparently achieved agreement that the draft Articles of the Agreed Measures 
should have headings and be arranged in the following order for the next 
working paper171 : 
I. Area of application 
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Protection of species 
Prevention of harmful interference 
Protection of Areas 
Precautions relating to introduced species 
Restriction upon trading in specimens 
Enforcement 
·-
Consultation an Exchange of Information 
Publicity 
Amendment 
Entry into force, accession and registration 
Languages and deposit 
Schedule A. Specially Protected Species 
Schedule B. Specially Protected Areas 
In effect this was the working paper which the Third Consultative Meeting 
used and there seems to have been a general desire that the meeting should 
achieve some tangible result with respect to conservation of Antarctic fauna 
and flora. An example of this will arose during discussion of that part of the 
Agreed Measures relating to accession when the Australian representative 
said that it was not for him to oppose discussion of anything concerning the 
Agreed Measures. 172 
At Brussels much of the controversy centred on sealing rather than other 
areas covered by the brief. One could argue that the Agreed Measures had 
been on the agen_da for three years and once agreement had been attained 
at the preparatory meeting the Third Consultative Meeting was, on the whole, 
concerned with minutiae rather than more substantial concerns. 
Questions of enforcement, amendment, accession and deposit were 
discussed at length. These issues led to discussion of Article IX (2) of the 
Antarctic Treaty. The Soviet delegation, in particular, was concerned that the 
document, the objective of which was to preserve the unique character of 
Antarctic fauna and flora, would only entitle those governments under Article 
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In effect this was the working paper which the Third Consultative Meeting 
used and there seems to have been a general desire that the meeting should 
achieve some tangible result with respect to conservation of Antarctic fauna 
and flora. An example of this will arose during discussion of that part of the 
Agreed Measures relating to accession when the Australian representative 
said that it was not for him to oppose discussion of anything concerning the 
Agreed Measures. 172 
At Brussels much of the controversy centred on sealing rather than other 
areas covered by the brief. One could argue that the Agreed Measures had 
been on the agenda for three years and once agreement had been attained 
at the preparatory meeting the Third Consultative Meeting was, on the whole, 
concerned with minutiae rather than more substantial concerns. 
Questions of enforcement, amendment, accession and deposit were 
discussed at length. These issues led to discussion of Article IX (2) of the 
Antarctic Treaty. The Soviet delegation, in particular, was concerned that the 
document, the objective of which was to preserve the unique character of 
Antarctic fauna and flora, would only entitle those governments under Article 
IX to adhere to the Agreed Measures.173 
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Myhre has asserted that "the US and others felt that any state eligible to 
accede to the Treaty should be allowed to accede to the Agreed Measures 
separately"(1984: 167). The Australians were of the opinion that accession 
should only be open to the signatories to the Treaty because if the Soviet or 
the US view was taken then there was a danger that the Agreed Measures 
might not be approved by governments. 174 The US Department of State report 
of the US Delegation to the Third Consultative Meeting made the point that all 
three points of view had problems. If independent accession was allowed 
then the legal question would arise as to what right kind of an interest a non 
treaty state had to have in Antarctica in order that it might accede. Similarly, if 
non treaty states were allowed to accede to certain recommendations, why 
could they not then attend the meetings that produced those 
recommendations? Finally, what would happen if recommendations existed 
for Consultative Parties only (1964:7)? In the face of these three arguments 
and the prevailing mood of the meeting in favour of reaching a binding 
agreement on conservation, the Australian proposal to limit accession to 
signatories was adopted. 
The question of the depository government for the Agreed Measures is an 
interesting example of the continued British reluctance to give the US further 
responsibilities. The US report of the meeting made this point with reference 
to the Australian view on matters pertaining to rights on the high seas, that 
the attitude "reflected their habitual view that Washington should not be 
allowed to take over the Treaty"(1964:6). With regard to a depository for 
Agreed Measures, the British asserted that it had been generally accepted 
that the government of Belgium would act as depository government. This 
view was supported by the Australians, but the US delegate made the point 
that Canberra R~commendation I-XIV implied that the US was automatically 
the depository government for all recommendations. 175 The Belgian chairman, 
believed that it would appear slightly absurd for Belgium to be the depository 
government for just one recommendation and that the matter should be the 
province of the US government in order to prevent any disorder in Antarctic 
Treaty procedures. The chairman believed that a majority were in favour and 
dropped the Article. This minor issue shows that throughout the negotiation of 
the Agreed Measures and despite differences of opinion over other policies, 
the Australians and British always kept in mind the long-term agenda for the 
Antarctic Treaty System. 
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C. TELECOMMUNICATIONS - THIRD ANTARCTIC TREATY MEETING, 
BRUSSELS 1964 
The method of negatively influencing the telecommunications question, which 
the British had adopted at the first two Consultative meetings (see chapter 3), 
altered slightly at the third. Roberts believed that many of the disagreements 
with the Australians stemmed from the Washington Treaty Meeting on 
Telecommunications held in 196-3. 176 Roberts asserted that these discussions 
revealed "differences of opinion over the whole range of problems connected 
with the status of Treaty meetings" .177 The policy adopted at Brussels is best 
explained with reference to the brief for Santiago in 1966, which outlined the 
developments on the question of telecommunications and gave clues as to 
how British policy evolved in 1964. 
The 1966 brief commented that the Australians had believed in 1964 that the 
1963 Washington Meeting on telecommunications had taken the status of a 
Consultative Meeting under Article IX (2) of the Treaty. 178 The British on the 
other hand took the view that the meeting had been a "meeting of experts" 
and had merely acted in an advisory capacity. For this reason the British, 
against the wishes of the Australians, had not taken any steps to approve the 
recommendations of 1963 because they would have opposed the British 
policy of letting SCAR deal with the question of telecommunications in the 
Antarctic rather than the WMO .179 By 1966, the British had formally realised 
that "telecommunications have been consistently entangled with radio 
reporting of meteorological data from the Antarctic" .180 With this in mind they 
proposed that "we should attempt to keep them separate in the future".181 It is 
possible to conclude that the policy laid down in 1966 was evolving during the 
1964 Brussels Meeting. 
In 1964, Roberts wrote that during discussion of Item 2 on 
telecommunications the Russians articulated the view that they were not 
happy with delays in receiving meteorological information at their stations. 
Also, they were opposed to the proposal that the WMO should have a 
Standing Committee for the Antarctic, preferring the efforts of the SCAR 
Working Group on Telecommunications. One would expect British 
agreement with this stand, but the progress of the negotiations show that the 
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British were prepared to acquiesce on the question of meteorological 
information. During Item 3, the relationship between WMO and the Treaty, a 
paper by Davies (the British secretary-general of WMO) was tabled, calling 
for Treaty governments to agree to the establishment of a Permanent 
Committee for Antarctic Meteorology. Roberts, who possibly did not wish to 
have a confrontation with the WMO seems to have shifted his ground, 
commenting that "it was unfortunate that the WMO did not go ahead with this 
proposal, but, instead, asked for this agreement which is not likely to be 
forthcoming" .182 The British then "put forward our draft recommendation and 
mentioned that the WMO Executive- Committee now meeting in Geneva, 
would like to know soon that the Treaty powers agreed with their proposal" .183 
This seems to point to a two-tiered policy of being prepared to acquiesce on 
the question of passing responsibility for meteorological reporting over to the 
WMO while keeping to the long-term goal of using the SCAR Working Group 
for the management of other radio communication in the Antarctic. It seems 
as though recommendation 111-V of the Third Consultative Meeting again 
negatively influenced the telecommunications question by merely calling for 
the examination of "the results of Recommendations made by the Washington 
Telecommunications Meeting" and the consideration of measures to improve 
Antarctic radio communications in the future" .184 Once again the British had 
kept to their long-term goal of keeping SCAR outside politically sensitive 
questions but had managed to retain, at least for the moment, its 
responsibility for radio communication. 
D. BRITISH CONCLUSIONS ON THE THIRD ANTARCTIC 
CONSULTATIVE MEETING, BRUSSELS 1964 
Roberts, writing the introduction to his diary on the third Consultative 
Meeting, believed that "if the Agreed Measures are approved by the Meeting 
they will form the first significant addition to international agreement on the 
Antarctic since the Treaty itself and will thus represent a considerable step 
forward". 185 These sentiments were echoed by the British brief (drafted by 
Roberts, David Anderson and John Heap and dated 24 October) for the 
Fourth Consultative Meeting in Santiago in 1966, which asserted that the 
Third Meeting unlike the Second had achieved a certain amount of useful 
progress. 186 The item on the conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora, the 
brief claimed, "arose largely from a British initiative ... [and] had been in 
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gestation for more than five years and marked the first substantial 
international agreement stemming directly from the Antarctic Treaty" .187 
The official departmental report from Sir Roderick Barclay to Foreign 
Secretary R.A. Butler immediately after the Brussels meeting put the Agreed 
Measures into context. Barclay began by restating the belief addressed in the 
despatch from the Second Meeting that at that time it had been hoped that 
the major obstacles that had prevented an agreement between 1961 and 
1962 might not in the future be as formidable as had been feared in those 
years. Barclay believed that this suspicion had proved to be the case and the 
tangible result was the Agreed Measures (see appendix 3). Originally 
envisaged as a convention, Barclay stated that negotiations at Brussels 
proceeded on the assumption that the best which could be achieved was the 
adoption of "agreed measures" as provided for in Article IX of the Treaty, with 
an accession clause covering States eligible to accede to the Treaty. 188 
Barclay asserted that vigorous opposition, particularly from Australia and 
Argentina had made it clear that a convention would not be possible. The 
dispatch claimed, however, that the provisions of the Agreed Measures 
satisfied "almost completely the aims of my delegation and the document as a 
whole represents a substantial step forward in the implementation of the 
Antarctic Treaty" .189 
The tone of the rest of the dispatch is cautiously optimistic and Barclay 
concluded that "we can take encouragement from this meeting ... the agreed 
measures on the Conservation of Fauna and Flora have so amplified and 
projected the principles of the Treaty as to merit the character of additional 
international agreements" .190 An element of caution was added, which was 
repeated in the British brief for Santiago in 1966. Here it was suggested that 
due to the closeness of the British to the Agreed Measures, the Delegation 
had been "more pleased about the results of the meeting as a whole than its 
overall results warranted" .191 Barclay made the point that "the subjects of 
most importance to us in the long term, such as jurisdiction and the creation 
of a Secretariat were not discussed" .192 The British brief for 1966 concluded 
that at Brussels the British dropped any hope of an open debate on these two 
subjects in favour of a policy of "creeping internationalism". It is clear in 1966 
that this policy was still in place, with the British envisaging for the long term 




Barclay concluded that Consultative Meetings had begun to behave like the 
meetings of an international legislative body. He hoped that during the 30 
years before the Treaty could come to be reconsidered, the governments 
could begin, through recommendations, to legislate on "the basic subjects 
such as jurisdiction". In this way, Barclay hoped, British "policy to achieve a 
final international agreement on these matters" could be addressed. 194 
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CHAPTER 5 
BRITISH INFLUENCE ON THE NEGOTIATION OF THE ANTARCTIC 
TREATY 
The previous three chapters have shown the positive influence exercised by 
the British on the development of the ATS between 1961 and 1964. The 
evidence presented has shown that in 1961 the British had clear short- and 
long-term objectives and appear to have been the primary country willing to 
use the Consultative Meetings positively, as provided for under Article IX of 
the Antarctic Treaty, in order to strengthen the Antarctic Treaty System 
against its perceived weaknesses. The best example of this influence is the 
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna. 
Although Joyner and Theis asserted that: "It was the United States that 
initially recommended the adoption of the Agreed Measures"(1997:103), it 
has been shown that the initiative for this agreement was British and that it 
was only after years of continual perseverance on their part that the Agreed 
Measures ~ere concluded. 
The vast majority of Antarctic commentators have supported Joyner and 
Theis' view that this agreement represented the first important addition to the 
Antarctic . regime. If one considers that questions of a Secretariat and 
Jurisdiction were also enacted by the British with a view to the long-term 
stability of the Treaty, then it is possible to conclude that they were the 
primary positive thinkers of the period 1961 - 64. It is interesting therefore, 
that a country so influential between 1961 and 1964 has been largely omitted 
from the most generally adopted interpretation of events leading up to 1959. 
This omission calls for a brief review of events leading up to 1959. Using the 
previously unava\lable writings of Roberts and Foreign Office dispatches it is 
possible to go some way to demonstrate the extent of British influence prior to 
and during the Washington Conference. 
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 
Much has been made of the fact that in 1948 the US had proposed an 
international solution to the Antarctic problem. However, as Quigg has 
pointed out, this solution did not include the freezing of the legal status quo 
and included no provision for coupling non-militarisation with an inspection 
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system (1983:144). This condominium proposal was only addressed to 
claimant states and became a dead letter in 1950 when the Soviet Union 
insisted that she be included in any agreement. In this respect, it is vastly 
different from those proposals emanating towards the end of the decade, 
which resulted directly in the Antarctic Treaty. 
The scientific activities of the IGY between 1954 and 1957 engendered a 
spirit of international co-operation in the Antarctic. Politically and 
diplomatically the greatest spur for an internationally binding agreement in 
the Antarctic may be traced to a -paper-which Roberts prepared for Cabinet in 
1956 (King & Savours 1995:5). Although this paper is yet to be released, 
there is evidence that the sentiments expressed formed the basis for a paper 
subsequently sent to Washington for consultation. Warren Reynolds, a 
member of the American delegations of 1961 and 1962, has confirmed 
(personal communication 1997) that the British paper was passed to Daniels 
at the time the drafts were being prepared for the Preparatory Meetings in 
Washington. Although the extent to which Daniels used British ideas cannot 
be proved, it is Reynolds' belief that once the 1956 Cabinet paper is 
released, significant similarities will be noted between its contents and the 
final Antarctic Treaty and that along with Daniels, Roberts will gain 
recognition as one of the foremost founding fathers of the Antarctic Treaty 
(personal communication 1997). 
Whether this proves to be the case or not, the following extracts from the 
introduction of Roberts' diary of the Washington Conference paint events in a 
rather different light from previous studies and contribute to the assertion that 
a seamless string of events run from 1957 to the conclusion of the Antarctic 
Treaty in 1959. Roberts asserted that United Kingdom proposals for an 
international regime in the Antarctic were initially discussed in London during 
August and September of 1957 .195 The discussions involved the Australians, 
New Zealanders and South Africans, with the Canadians present as 
observers. 196 Following this, talks were subsequently held in Washington 
between the British, Australians, New Zealanders and Americans. 
Roberts claimed that by the start of 1958 virtual agreement had been 
reached, subject to approval by the four governments, on many aspects of 
the proposals put forward by the UK.197 The principles included non-
militarisation, international collaboration in science, provisions for an 
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executive body with a consultative council submitting reports to the UN, and, 
most importantly, the freezing of the legal status quo for as long as the 
scheme remained in place. 198 Roberts suggested that at the end of January 
1958, the Australian Government decided that they could not accept more 
than a limited scheme for the purpose of securing the non-militarisation of the 
continent and the continuation of scientific co-operation. 199 These obstacles 
were overcome following talks between the Australian Prime Minister 
(Menzies) and the British Prime Minister (Macmillan) in February and 
between the Australian Minister for External Affairs and the US Secretary of 
State (Dulles) and the New Zealand Prime Minister (Nash) in Manilla, all in 
1958. After this the Australians accepted the proposal agreed previously in 
Washington that the legal status quo had to be frozen during the currency of 
the agreement.200 
On 11 February 1958, a press conference during Macmillan's Commonwealth 
tour allowed the British Prime Minister to report that the leaders of Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand agreed on the principle that scientific activity 
should be free and that the continent should not be allowed to become a 
base for military activity2°1 (Quigg 1983: 143). Roberts believed that the press 
leakages that followed gave a "fairly full account of the tentative proposals 
put forward by the United Kingdom". 202 
Roberts asserted that this press activity "led to precipitate action on the part 
of the United States".203 An aide memoirs of 24 March 1958 was addressed to 
all the countries later to be present at the Washington Conference, 
requesting views of most of the proposals discussed in Washington the 
previous year (including the idea of freezing the legal status quo). In 
deference to the Australians, no mention was made of the need to regulate 
exploitation of min~ral resources, as they wished "if possible to retain 
exclusive sovereign rights in this respect". 204 The formal invitation to the 
Washington Conference was made on 2 May 1958 and a Presidential 
statement to this effect followed from President Eisenhower. 
Roberts suggested that the British regarded the extension of invitations to the 
conference to Belgium, Japan and South Africa without first asking British 
approval as "premature". However, Roberts wrote, "we had no regrets that the 
United States had put out, as their own, proposals which had originated from 
a British initiative. Since they themselves are not claimants and have never 
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recognised the claims of others in the Antarctic, they are in a stronger 
position than we ourselves to convene a conference".205 Also, the British felt 
that a direct request would look to the Chileans and Argentines like a sign of 
weakness and might have hardened the resolve of the two countries not to 
attend.206 
The preparatory meetings held in Washington produced a basic draft treaty 
submitted to the working group by the United States. Agreement was made 
possible by Soviet compromise from January 1959 onwards, which allowed 
the Conference to go ahead and involved the submission of a separate paper 
containing a Soviet redraft of the American proposals. For their part, the 
British may have found it convenient for the US rather than themselves to 
formally submit papers, but they presented re-drafts of individual Articles and 
Roberts wrote after the preparatory meetings that "the United Kingdom 
Government originally proposed a scheme far more comprehensive than is 
now envisaged. We wanted to establish a High Authority which would 
effectively exercise control throughout the continent ... we [now] want the 
Treaty to be as comprehensive as possible" .207 
B. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, 1959 
At the Washington Conference the British contribution was guided by two 
principal aims. The primary one was that the Conference should produce a 
binding Treaty and the secondary one that any Treaty should be as 
comprehensive as possible. It would be possible at this point to produce a 
history of the negotiation of the minutiae of the Articles of the Treaty. 
However, in order to gain a broad overview of British influence during the 
Conference it is possible, with the help of the diaries, to look at four questions 
arising during the Conference which the British believed were central to their 
aims. The official Foreign Office dispatch will then be addressed in order to 
show how the British viewed their influence at the Conference and to what 
extent they were satisfied with the results achieved. , 
On 14 October, one day before the Conference officially opened, Sir Esler 
Dening (head of the British delegation) met with M. Charpentier (head of the 
French delegation) and was officially told that the French refused to accept 
Article IV and therefore the freezing of the legal status qua. Charpentier 
claimed that to discuss this would cast doubt on the validity of French 
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sovereignty and that this stand was supported by the French legal expert 
Professor Gros and even more strongly by the French Foreign Minister.208 
Dening showed Charpentier correspondence between Gros and Fitzmaurice 
(the British legal expert) of 1958, when the substance of Article IV had been 
agreed. The British viewed the French stand as dangerous because "the draft 
article IV, is in our view essential to a successful Treaty".209 This British 
position was supported by the Australians, for whom Casey sent off a strongly 
worded letter to the French Foreign Minister while Dening told Charpentier 
that the French and the British were in "diametrically opposed camps" and 
that the subject had been agreed at the preparatory negotiations.210 Phleger, 
the United States chairman of the Conference, suggested to Fitzmaurice that 
the US might suggest a total deletion of rule 37 (eliminating the necessity for 
unanimity) given the French attitude. Roberts commented that "if the French 
refuse to change their minds, there may be something to be said in favour of 
an eleven Power Treaty, if all of them can agree. It is more doubtful if the 
deletion of rule 37 is the best way of achieving this end". 211 
Finally, the French only agreed to the retention of Article IV after Professor 
Gros came from Paris and had discussions with Fitzmaurice, Phleger, and 
Tunkin (USSR) and suggested amendments to satisfy the French Parliament 
that no diminution of French rights had occurred.212 In Roberts' opinion the 
French position had been "somewhat supercilious" and mirrored the attitude 
of M. Scalabre (deputy of the French delegation) who told Freeland on a day 
that the drafting committee met that he cared much more about preserving 
the integrity of the French language than about the contents of the Treaty.213 
One of the British objectives was to gain an Article on jurisdiction. On this 
objective they were unsuccessful despite producing two significant draft 
articles on the s.ubject. On 11 November the Soviets asserted that they could 
not accept the draft Article on Jurisdiction as agreed by other delegations and 
wished to retain Article I of the UK original draft. This stymied the British, who 
in the face of South American opposition to the Soviet proposal, noted that 
the revised UK draft had been created for the purpose of reaching a 
compromise.214 Article VIII provided the only advance on the issue ordering 
that observers, exchanged scientific personnel and their staffs were under 
the jurisdiction of the state that designated them observers or sent them on 
the exchange (Myhre 1984:99). Dening, in the official dispatch after the 
Conference, claimed that the British objective was unsuccessful due to the 
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attitude of "the Argentine and Chilean delegations (supported by France), 
from which they refused to budge even though quite vigorously attacked by 
the Soviet Union".215 Dening suspected that the inability to compromise would 
mean that "in practice both the United States and the Soviet Union will insist 
upon exercising exclusive jurisdiction where their own nationals are 
concerned". 216 
Dening described the third British concern, that of nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes. He explained that "the subject had never been raised 
before the Conference assembled and no preliminary views on it were 
available".217 This view seems to be corroborated by the omission of the 
subject from Roberts' introduction to the Washington Conference, where 
accession is expected to be "the most serious of the outstanding points to be 
decided at the Conference".218 Initially the Argentines and the Chileans 
proposed an addition to Article I but withdrew this because it was envisaged 
that Article I would deal with non-militarisation only.219 Dening wrote that it 
became clear that the five Southern Hemisphere states had large concerns 
about the nuclear explosion issue and Roberts noted that these states "were 
clearly not prepared to have their views over-ridden by what they call the 
nuclear powers".220 Dening asserted that the next step was a joint Australian 
and Argentine draft Article which sought to prohibit nuclear explosions and 
the disposal of radioactive waste except after prior consultation, but did not 
impose an absolute ban. The absence of a total ban was probably due to 
lobbying by the British and Americans, although for presentational purposes 
the Australians did not mention the fact that Farinholt (US}, Roberts, Holland 
(Australia) and Shuttleworth (South Africa) had jointly prepared the draft two 
days before221 Dening claimed that after the presentation of the revised 
proposals, the Soviet delegate stated categorically that there were two 
alternatives. The first was to have no mention in the Treaty of nuclear 
explosions for peaceful purposes, and the second was to impose an absolute 
ban. The Soviets abandoned the first idea of permissively not mentioning the 
problem and Roberts believed that this was because Tunkin, the Soviet 
delegate, "was unable (or unwilling) to resist such a splendid opportunity 
presented to him for splitting the Western ranks on the issue of nuclear 
detonations for peaceful purposes".222 Dening noted in the end it was "the 
United States which gave way" and Tunkin who "won".223 
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On the question of accession, Dening made it clear that the remaining 
participating nations would accept what was agreeable both to the US and 
the Soviet Union.224 Roberts had predicted before the Conference that this 
would be the most controversial question, and despite being over-shadowed 
by the nuclear question it showed that the Soviets were able to strongly 
influence the Treaty negotiation. Initially the New Zealand representative 
called for a proposal under Article X, whereby the Treaty would be open for 
accession by any state which was a member of the United Nations or of the 
Specialised Agencies.225 The Soviets countered with the proposal which 
provided for the Treaty to be open - to any state carrying out scientific 
investigations in Antarctica.226 From the British perspective this could feasibly 
in the future produce the problem of the Soviet Union vetoing the accession 
of the German Federal Republic. Similarly, it would mean the possible 
bargaining of West German accession for that of East Germany.
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believed that the only solution would be to make accession open to members 
of the United Nations and to any other state whose application to accede was 
approved by a majority of the parties to the Treaty (including a majority of 
those entitled to participate in the meetings provided for in Article Vlll). 228 
This proved unacceptable to the Soviet delegation, whose position prevailed 
over that of the US, and in Dening's words "they may be said to have won on 
points". 
In his dispatch to the Foreign Secretary (Selwyn Lloyd), Dening made it clear 
that "although the invitation to the conference had been issued by President 
Eisenhower ... , the original initiative had come from the United Kingdom".
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The principal motive for the British, he claimed, had been to provide "a 
solution to problems caused by the Argentine and Chilean claims in the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies".230 Dening concluded his dispatch by 
asserting that "we have secured the establishment of a continuing 
organisation which, though it falls short of what we had hoped for in the way 
of international control, does provide a means by which we may, in the course 
of time, reach agreement on a number of points which the Treaty does not 
cover at all (such as exploitation of mineral resources), or covers in a manner 
not wholly satisfactory to us (ie. Jurisdiction and settlement of disputes)".231 
In the final entry to the Washington Conference journal, Roberts offered his 
overall appreciation of the Treaty. He commented, "I think it represents an 




A widely circulated view of the creation and evolution of the Antarctic Treaty 
System has placed the US at the centre of both. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
presented a revised view of the evolution of the ATS, one highlighting the 
influence of the British as a . catalyst for positive initiatives designed to 
strengthen the Antarctic Treaty against its perceived weaknesses. The 
previously unavailable journals of Dr. Brian Roberts (head of the Polar 
Section at the Foreign Office, 1943 - 75) and previously unavailable Foreign 
Office dispatches from the first three Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings 
show the British as perhaps the only Contracting Party to the Treaty prepared 
to use Article IX to initiate positive ideas (designed to strengthen the Treaty), 
and possessing the political will to see the initiatives through to fruition. 
Joyner and Theis (1997: 44) have asserted that the first important addition to 
the Antarctic regime came in 1964 with the Agreed Measures for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora. The primary sources used here 
for the first time confirm this view. However, it was also shown that this was a 
British initiative emanating from Roberts and Holdgate, who worked on the 
first draft of what became the Agreed Measures at the Scott Polar Research 
Institute in Autumn 1960. This positive short-term aim was initiated in order 
that the Treaty System might one day be strong enough to contemplate 
additional agreements on such issues as a mineral regime. Also, it was 
hoped that the primary British aim of internationalisation (which had become 
'creeping internationalisation' by 1964) would, in the long-term, be made 
possible by the achievement of such short term objectives. 
The primary sources show that the British had been unhappy with the 
consensus achieved at Washington in 1959. An international regime had 
been contemplated by the British, and the Roberts journals show that in 1960, 
before the first ATCM, Roberts was concerting his views on a proposed 
Secretariat with high-ranking polar officials from Australia and New Zealand. 
The Australian proposal of a Secretariat in 1961 was influenced by the 
British, although Roberts had envisaged a small Secretariat in Canberra, and 
a technical arm in Washington to allow the efficient running of the Treaty as 
well as keeping SCAR outside politically sensitive questions. This initiative 
was eventually blocked by those Contracting Parties that feared further 




consensus of 1959 was as far as internationalisation in the region should go. 
The British initiative for jurisdiction in the region is another example of a 
short-term aim designed to achieve the long-term goal of internationalisation. 
However, under pressure from the Argentine and Chilean delegations, the 
British withdrew this Item from the agenda for the second time in 1962. 
The new primary sources also show that the British had positive ideas for 
advancing the question of telecommunications in the Antarctic in 1960/61 . 
These were linked to the idea of a Secretariat and a technical arm able to 
deal with politically sensitive que-stions.- Due to the weakness of the 1959 
agreement, discussion on telecommunications underlined the efficacy of 
Article IV of the Treaty. At the first ATCM it became clear that a Secretariat 
could not be established. The British were therefore forced to withdraw their 
positive proposals and negatively influence the question in order to keep 
SCAR outside political questions that would surely arise in relation to 
telecommunications This they did with success between 1961 and 1964, 
managing to limit the influence of the ITU and the WMO in the region, thereby 
securing the position of SCAR outside damaging political questions. 
Having used the new primary sources to show the large positive influence of 
the British between 1961 and 1964, attention was then turned to the widely 
held interpretation of the creation of the Antarctic Treaty. The assertion by 
Joyner and Theis that "the United States took the lead. Indeed the Antarctic 
Treaty represents the culmination of a series of negotiations initiated by the 
US government" (1997: 32), was shown to be at best only partially true. The 
Roberts journals, the Foreign Office dispatches of the period and a personal 
communication from Reynolds show that in the future it may be possible to 
prove that a seamless string of events ran from the presentation of a paper to 
Cabinet by Roberts in 1956 to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. 
Particularly important in the negotiation of the Treaty was the notion of the 
freezing of the legal claims on the continent and provision for the coupling of 
non-militarisation within an inspection system (Quigg 1983: 144). While it was 
impossible to prove the exact extent to which British initiatives influenced the 
work of Ambassador Daniels, for their part the British were certain of their 
primacy to many ideas adopted in the Treaty although the scheme proposed 
by them was more comprehensive than that finally agreed. 
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In 1995 Heap, Roberts' successor at the Foreign Office, wrote that "the story 
of Brian Roberts at the Foreign Office remains to be written; it will be a major 
undertaking, but until it is, there can be no clear, in depth understanding of 
how it has come about that the United Kingdom has made a contribution to 
international polar affairs far beyond that which might reasonably have been 
expected of it" (King & Savours 1995: preface). This work initiated a study of 
a small portion of Roberts' diplomatic career and to demonstrated the 
influence exerted by the British on the Treaty System between 1961 and 
1964. It was made possible by the release of important and previously 
unseen primary British sources which - have added another piece to the 
jigsaw-like history of the evolution and the creation of the ATS. Many other 
primary sources remain inaccessible. As and when they become open to 
study, it may be possible to accord appropriate credit to other participant 
countries. This thesis argues that, in particular, the British contribution has 
been previously underestimated, but much more remains to be done, both on 
British and other national sources. As Roberts himself wrote at the end of the 




DRAFT CONVENTION OF THE PROTECTION OF WILDLIFE IN THE 
ANTARCTIC 
(BY A. WATTS & B. ROBERTS, 9 JULY 1961) 
Artlcle I 
The provisions of the present Convention shall apply to the area south of 60 
Degrees South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present 
Convention shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of 
the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high seas 
within that area. 
Article II 
In this convention 'native mammal' shall mean any individual, at any stage of 
the life cycle, or any species belonging to the Class Mammalia excepting 
members of the Order Cetacea (whales), indigenous to the Antarctic or 
occurring there by natural agencies of dispersal. Similarly 'native bird' shall 
mean any individual , at any stage of the life cycle (including eggs), of any 
species of the Class Aves indigenous to the Antarctic or occurring there by 
natural agencies of dispersal. 
Article II I 
Each Party shall prohibit the killing, wounding, capturing or molesting of any 
native mammal or ~ird, as well as all attempts to kill, wound, capture or 
molest them, except as provided in Article IV of the present Convention. 
Article IV 
1. Notwithstanding the provision of Article II of the present Convention, and 
subject to the provision of sub-paragraph of this Article, any appropriate 
authority may expressly permit the killing, wounding, capturing or molesting of 
any native mammal or bird for the following purposes: 






b. to provide scientific specimens, or to obtain scientific information, or to 
provide specimens for museums, zoological gardens, or other educational or 
cultural uses, 
c. to provide specimens for a private collection, 
d. to provide specimens or products for commercial purposes. 
2. The permission granted by the appropriate Authority in accordance with 
subparagraph 1 of this Article must state the species and number of native 
mammals or birds affected by it, and the method or methods which maybe 
employed to kill, wound, capture or molest them. No such permission, 
however, may be granted if to do so would infringe Articles VI or VI I of the 
present Convention. 
3. In this Article and Article V, "appropriate Authority" shall mean the 
Government of the Contracting Party of which the person concerned is a 
national or which has organized or is responsible for the expedition or base of 
which that person is a member, or any body or person nominated by such 
government for the purpose in question. 
Article V 
Within the area to which the provisions of the present Convention apply each 
Contracting Party shall prohibit the private possession or control, or the 
buying or selling or attempts to buy or sell any native mammal or bird or 
product derived therefrom, unless the possession of or dealing in such 
mammals and birds has been authorised by the appropriate Authority. 
Article VI 
Species of native mammal or bird which merit special protection shall, with 
the agreement of the Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, be 
designated by them as "absolutely protected species", and once thus 
designated each Contracting Party to the present Convention shall prohibit 
the killing, capturing, wounding or molesting of such mammals and birds 
except for purposes of scientific study or in an emergency. 
Article VII 
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Areas which are of outstanding scientific interest shall, with the agreement of 
the Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, be designated by them as 
"absolute sanctuaries", and within areas thus designated each Contracting 
Party to the present Convention shall prohibit the killing, capturing, wounding 
or molesting of any native mammal or bird except for scientific purposes or in 
an emergency. They shall furthermore prohibit the interference with such 
areas by the structural alteration of the terrain, the construction of 
installations, the overflying of aircraft or helicopters at low altitudes, the 
passage of vehicles or parties on foot, or any other activity likely to disturb or 
to alter the habitat, other tan for purposes of scientific research or in an 
emergency. 
Article VII I 
Each Contracting Party shall prohibit the importation into the Antarctic of any 
species of vertebrate animal which does not naturally occur there, apart from: 
a. sledge dogs 
b. domestic stock or other animals to be kept under controlled conditions for 
scientific research or for food. 
They shall completely prohibit any alien species thus imported to range 
without restriction in any part of the Antarctic 
Article IX 
The Contracting Parties may make such arrangements as they consider 
necessary for: 
a. collecting records of the numbers of each species of native bird and 
mammal killed or captured annually in the Antarctic; 
b. obtaining information as to the status of native birds and mammals i the 
Antarctic, and the extent to which any species needs protection; 
c. obtaining advice as to the species which should be designated 'absolutely 
protected species' under Article VI above, and the areas which should be 
designated 'absolute sanctuaries' under Article VII above; 
e. preparing and circulating to organising authorities, expeditions, and bases, 
lists of absolute sanctuaries, a brochure explaining the aims of provisions of 





Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, 
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one 
engages in any activity in the Antarctic contrary to the principles or purposes 
of the present Convention. 
Article XI 
The present Convention may be modified or amended at any time by 
unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties. Any such modification or 
amendment shall enter into force when the depository Government has 
received notice from all the Contracting Parties that they have ratified it. 
Article XII 
1 . The present Convention shall be open to accession by any State which is a 
Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty signed at Washington on December 
1, 1959. 
2, The present Convention shall be subject to ratification by each acceding 
State, in accordance with its constitutional process. Instruments of ratification 
shall be deposited with the Government of ....... , hereby designated as the 
depository government. The Government shall inform all acceding States of 
the date of each deposit of an instrument of ratification, the date of entry into 
force of the Convention and of any modification or amendment thereto. 
3. The present Convention shall be registered by the depository Government 
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article XIII 
The present Convention, done in the English, French , Russian and Spanish 
languages, each version being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the 
archives of the depository Government, which shall transmit duly certified 




APPENDIX C TO BRIEF ON ITEM 21 FIRST ANTARCTIC TREATY 
CONSULTATIVE MEETING 1961 
EXTRACTS FROM THE ORIGINAL UNITED KINGDOM DRAFT 
CONVENTION FOR AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME IN ANTARCTICA 
CHAPTER I 
THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR ANTARCTICA 
Article I (Definition of Antarctica) 
The Territory of Antarctica shall, for the purposes of the present Convention, 
compromise all the land, and appurtenant territorial waters and continental 
shelf, situated in the whole are between latitude 60 degrees South and the 
South Pole, shall not extend to any waters in the said area consisting of high 
seas beyond the limits of territorial waters. 
Article II (Establishment of the International Regime) 
1. The Contracting Parties, without prejudice to any title or claim of tittle, 
which any of them may have to any part of the Territory of Antarctica as 
defined in Article 1, agree to establish, and there is hereby established, an 
international regime for the said territory, to function in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Convention. 
2. The international regime for the Territory of Antarctica shall compromise a 
High Authority, having executive and legislative powers; a Council of the 
Contracting Parties, having supervisory powers; and a Supreme Court for 




!. In and for the purposes of the excursus of its functions , the Authority shall , 
subject to the provisions of the present Convention, be deemed to posses all 
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the normal powers of a government, with full rights of administration, 
jurisdiction and control in and over the Territory and all persons therein. 
2. In and for the purposes of the excursus of its functions, the Authority may 
recruit and appoint personnel and staff of every kind and determine the 
relevant conditions of service. It may also set up such institutions and 
subsidiary organs, whether within or without Antarctica, as it may think 
necessary. 
3. The Authority may delegate an-y part of its functions, and may, for the 
discharge of these, make use of any existing organisation, organs or 
institutions, particularly sucb as may already be operating in or with respect 
to any part of the Territory, or which may be specialised to do so. 
Article VII (Legislation) 
The authority may by proclamation, rode or decree make laws for the 
Territory. It shall cause to be drafted and shall promulgate a uniform civil and 
penal Code for Antarctica. The contents of the Code shall, initially, be 
confined to the minimum considered necessary for the order and good 
government of the Territory. Without prejudice to the principle of uniformity, 
the Authority shall, in making law for Antarctica, take account of any existing 
legislation heretofore applicable in any part of the Territory. 
Article VIII (courts and Constabulary) 
! . The Authority shall appoint such magistrates and other judges, whether 
visiting or resident, as may be appropriate to the circumstances of the 
Territory, who shall administer its laws and decrees, and shall for that 
purpose and excursus all normal judicial functions and powers as defined in 
the Authority's Code. 
2. The Authority shall appoint a Constabulary in such numbers as may be 
appropriate to the circumstances of the Territory, for the preservation of law 
and order and the enforcement of judicial orders or decisions. The functions 
and powers of the Constabulary shall be defined in the Authority's Code. 
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3. Sentences of imprisonment shall, as the magistrate or judge may 
determine, be served either in Territory belonging to the State of which the 
offender is a national, or in the territory of any one of the Contracting parties 
nearest to the place of trial, by virtue of arrangements to that effect to be 
entered into by the Authority with the Contracting Parties. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SUPREME COURT FOR ANTARCTICA 
Article XXV (establishment and Composition) 
1. There shall be a Supreme Court for Antarctica, composed as provided in 
its statute which is set out in Annex 3 hereto. 
2. There shall be a Registrar and a Registry for the Court appointed and 
selected as provided in the said Annex. 
3. The court shall sit at the permanent seat of the Authority. 
Article XXVI (Functions) 
1. The functions of the Supreme Court shall be (a) to act as an Administrative 
Tribunal to hear and determine all questions and disputes of an internal and 
administrative character arising within the Authority, or affecting its staff, 
organs, institutions; (b) to act as a Court of Appeal from the decisions of 
magistrates and judges appointed by the Authority to administer justice and 
hear causes at first instance in or respecting the Territory of Antarctica, and 
provided for by Article VIII above. 
2. In the exercise and discharge of these functions the Supreme Court shall 
act as set out in, and shall apply the provisions, both procedural and 
substantive, of its Statute. 
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APPENDIX 3 
AGREED MEASURES FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC FAUNA 
AND FLORA 
PREAMBLE 
The Governments participating in the Third Consultative Meeting under 
Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, 
Desiring to implement the principles and purposes of the Antarctic Treaty; 
Recognising the scientific importance of the study of Antarctic Fauna and 
Flora, their adaptation to their rigorous environment, and their inter-
relationship with that environment; 
Considering the unique nature of these fauna and flora, their circumpolar 
range, and particularly their defencelessness and susceptibility to 
extermination; 
Desiring by further international collaboration within the framework of the 
Antarctic Treaty to promote and achieve the objectives of protection, scientific 
study, and rational use of these fauna and flora; and 
Having particular regard to the conservation principles developed by the 
Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) of the International 
Council of Scientific Unions; 
Hereby consider the Treaty Area as a Special Conservation Area and have 
agreed on the following measures: 
Article I 
1. These Agreed ~easures shall apply to the same area to which the 
Antarctic Treaty is applicable (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty Area) 
namely the area south of 60 degrees South Latitude, including all ice shelves. 
2. However, nothing in these Agreed Measures shall prejudice or in any way 
affect the rights, or the excursus of the rights, of any State under international 
law with regard to the high seas within the Treaty Area, or restrict the 
implementation of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty with · respect to 
inspection. 
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3. The Annexes to these Agreed Measures shall form an integral part thereof, 
and all references to the Agreed Measures shall be considered to include the 
Annexes. 
ARTICLE II 
For the purposes of these Agreed Measures: 
(a) "Native Mammal" means any member, at any stage of its life cycle, of any 
species belonging to Class Mammalia indigenous to the Antarctic or 
occurring there through natural agencies-of dispersal, excepting whales. 
(b) "Native bird" means any member, at any stage of its life cycle (including 
eggs), of any species of -the Class Ave indigenous to the Antarctic or 
occurring there through natural agencies of dispersal. 
(c) "Native Plant" means any kind of vegetation at any stage of its life cycle 
(including seeds), indigenous to the Antarctic r occurring there through 
natural agencies of dispersal. 
(d) "Appropriate authority" means any person authorized by a Participating 
Government to issue permits under these Agreed Measures. 
(e) "Permit" means a formal permission in writing issued by an appropriate 
authority. 
(f) "Participating Government" means any Government for which these 
Agreed Measures have become effective in accordance with Article XIII of 
these Agreed Measures. 
ARTICLE Ill . 
Each Participating Government shall take appropriate action to carry out 
these Agreed Measures 
ARTICLE IV 
The Participating Governments shall prepare and circulate to members of 
expeditions and stations information to ensure understanding and 
observance of these Agreed Measures, setting forth in particular prohibited 




The provisions of these Agreed Measures shall not apply in cases of extreme 
emergency involving possible loss of human life or involving the safety of 
ships or aircraft. 
ARTICLE VI 
1. Each Participating Government shall prohibit within the Treaty Area the 
killing, wounding, capturing or molesting of any native mammal or native bird, 
or any attempt at any such act, except irr accordance with a permit. 
2. Such permits shall be drawn in terms as specific as possible and issued 
only for the following purposes: 
(a) to provide indispensable food for men and dogs in the Treaty Area in 
limited quantities, and in conformity with the purposes and principles of these 
Agreed Measures; 
(b) to provide specimens for scientific study or scientific information; 
(c) to provide specimens for museums, zoological gardens, or other 
educational or cultural institutions or uses. 
3. Permits for Specially protected Areas shall be issued only in accordance 
with the provisions of Article VIII. 
4. Participating Governments shall limit the issue of such permits so as to 
ensure as far as possible that: 
(a) no more native mammals or birds are killed or taken in any year than can 
normally be replaced by natural reproduction in the following breeding 
season; 
(b) the variety of species and the balance of the natural ecological systems 
existing within the Treaty Area are maintained. 
5. The species of native mammals and birds listed in Annex A of these 
Measures shall be. designated "Specially Protected Species", and shall be 
accorded special protection by Participating !Governments. 
6. A Participating Government shall not authorize an appropriate authority to 
issue a permit with respect to a Specially Protected Species except in 
accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article. 
7. A permit may be issued under this Article with respect to a Specially 
Protected Species, provided that: 
(a) it is issued for a compelling scientific purpose, and 
(b) the actions permitted thereunder will not jeopardise the existing natural 
ecological system or the survival of that species. 
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ARTICLE VII 
1. Each Participating Government shall take appropriate measures to 
minimize harmful interference within the Treaty Area with the normal living 
conditions of any native mammal or bird, or any attempt at such harmful 
interference, except as permitted under Article VI. 
2. The following acts and activities shall be considered as harmful 
interference: 
(a) allowing dogs to run free, 
(b) flying helicopters or other aircraft in a manner which would unnecessarily 
disturb bird and seal concentrations, or landing close to such concentrations 
(e.g. within 200m), 
(c) driving vehicles unnecessarily close to concentrations of birds and seals 
(e.g. within 200 m) 
(d) use of explosives close to concentrations of birds and seals, 
(e) discharge of firearms close to bird and seal concentrations (e.g. within 
300 m) 
(f) any disturbance of bird and seal colonies during the breeding period by 
persistent attention from persons on foot. 
However, the above activities, with the exception of those mentioned in (a) 
and (e) may be permitted to the minimum extent necessary for the 
establishment, supply and operation of stations. 
3. Each Participating Government shall take all reasonable steps towards the 
alleviation of pollution of the waters adjacent to the coast and ice shelves. 
ARTICLE VIII . 
1 . The areas of outstanding scientific interest listed in Annex B shall be 
designated "Specially Protected Areasll and shall be accorded special 
protection by the Participating Governments in order to preserve their unique 
natural ecological system. 
2. In addition to the prohibitions and measures of protection dealt with in 
other Articles of these Agreed Measures, the Participating Governments shall 
in Specially Protected Areas further prohibit; 
(a) the collection of any native plant , except in accordance with a permit ; 
(b) the driving of any vehicle . 
3. A permit issued under Article VI shall not have effect within a Specially 
Protected Area except in accordance with paragraph 4 of the present Article. 
4. A permit shall have effect within a Specially Protected Area provided that: 
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(a) it was issued for a compelling scientific purpose which cannot be served 
elsewhere: and 
(b) the actions permitted thereunder will not jeopardise the natural ecological 
system existing in that Area. 
ARTICLE IX 
1. Each Participating Government shall prohibit the bringing into the Treaty 
Area of any species of animal or plant not indigenous to that Area, except in 
accordance with a permit. 
2. Permits under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be drawn in terms as 
specific as possible and shall be issued to allow the importation only of the 
animals and plants listed in Annex C. When any such animal or plant might 
cause harmful interference with the natural system if left unsupervised within 
the Treaty Area, such permits shall require that it be kept under controlled 
conditions and, after it has served its purpose, it shall be removed from the 
Treaty Area or destroyed. 
3. Nothing in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall apply to the importation 
of food into the Treaty Area so long as animals and plants used for this 
purpose are kept under controlled conditions. 
4. Each Participating Government undertakes to ensure that all reasonable 
precautions shall be taken to prevent the accidental introduction of parasites 
and diseases into the Treaty Area. In particular, the precautions listed in 
Annex D shall be taken. 
ARTICLE X 
Each participating Government undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, 
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one 
engages in any activity in the Treaty Area contrary to the principles or 
purposes of these Agreed Measures. 
ARTICLE XI 
Each Participating Government whose expeditions use ship$ sailing under 
flags of nationalities other than its own shall, as far as feasible, arrange with 




1. The Participating Governments may make such arrangements as may be 
necessary for the discussion of such matters as: 
(a) the collection and exchange of records (including records of permits) and 
statistics concerning the numbers of each species of native mammal and bird 
killed or captured annually in the Treaty Area; 
(b) the obtaining and exchange of information as to the status of native 
mammals and birds in the Treaty Area, -and the extent to which any species 
needs protection. 
(c) the number of native mammals or birds which should be permitted to be 
harvested for food, scientific study , or other uses in the various regions; 
(d) the establishment of a common form in which this information shall be 
submitted by Participating Governments in accordance with paragraph 2 of 
this Article. 
2. Each Participating Government shall inform the other Governments in 
writing before the end of November of each year of the steps taken and 
information collected in the preceding period of 1 st July to 30th June relating 
to the implementation of these Agreed Measures. Governments exchanging 
information under paragraph 5 of Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty may at the 
same time transmit the information relating to the implementation of these 
Agreed Measures. 
ARTICLE XII 
1. After receipt by the government designated in Recommendation I-XIV (%) 
of notification of approval by all governments whose representatives are 
entitled to participate in meetings provided for under Article IX of the Antarctic 
Treaty, these Agreed Measures shall become effective for those 
governments. 
2. Thereafter any Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty may, in 
consonance with the purposes of Recommendation Ill-VII, accept these 
Agreed Measures by notifying the designated Government of its intention to 
apply the Agreed Measures and to be bound by them. The Agreed Measures 
shall become effective with regard to such Governments on the date of 
receipt of such notification. 
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3. The designated Government shall inform the Governments referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article of each notification of approval, the effective date 
of these Agreed Measures and of each notification of acceptance. The 
designated Government shall also inform any Government which has 
accepted these Agreed Measures of each subsequent notification of 
acceptance. 
ARTICLE XIV 
1. These Agreed Measures may be amended at any time by unanimous 
agreement of the Governments whose Representatives are entitled to 
participate in meetings under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty. 
2. The Annexes, in particular, may be amended as necessary through 
diplomatic channels. 
3. An amendment proposed through diplomatic channels shall be submitted 
in writing to the designated Government which shall communicate it to the 
Governments referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article for approval; at 
the same time, it shall be communicated to the other Participating 
Governments. 
4. Any amendment shall become effective on the date on which notifications 
of approval have been received by the designated Government and from all 
of the Governments referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
5. The designated Government shall notify those same Governments of the 
date of receipt of each approval communicated to it and the date on which 
the amendment will become effective for them. 
6. Such amendment shall become effective on that same date for all other 
Participating Governments, except those which before the expiry of two 
months after that date notify the designated Government that they do not 
accept it 
ANNEXES TO THESE AGREED MEASURES 
Annex A Specially Protected Species 
Annex B Specially Protected Areas 
Annex C Importation of animals and plants 
The following animals and plants may be imported into the Treaty Area in 
accordance with permits issued under Article IX (") of these Agreed 
Measures: 
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(a) sledge dogs, 
(b) domestic animals and plants, 
(c) laboratory animals and plants. 
ANNEX D Precautions to prevent accidental introduction of parasites and 
diseases into the Treaty Area 
The following precautions shall be taken: 
1. Dogs; All dogs imported into the Treaty Area shall be inoculated against 
the following diseases: 
(a) distemper; 
(b) contagious canine hepatitis; 
(c) rabies; 
(d) leptospirosis (L. canicola and L. icterohaemorrhagicae) 
Each dog shall be inoculated at least two months before the time of its arrival 
in the Treaty Area. 
2. Poultry: Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IX (3) of these Agreed 




THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 
The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French 
Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, and the UniteEI States of America, 
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall 
continue for ever to be used ~xclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not 
become the scene or object of international discord; 
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific 
knowledge resulting from international co-operation in scientific 
investigation in Antarctica; 
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the 
continuation and development of such co-operation on the basis of 
freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied during the 
International Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science 
and the progress of all mankind; 
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica 
for peaceful purposes only and the continuance of international 
harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter 
alia, any measure of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and 
fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type 
of weapon. 
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for 
scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose. 
ARTICLE II 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and co-operation toward that end, as 
applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the 
provisions of the present Treaty. 
ARTICLE Ill 
1 . In order to promote international co-operation in scientific investigation in Antarctica, 
as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree that, to 
the greatest extent feasible and 
practicable: 
a. information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged to 
permit maximum economy of and efficiency of operations; 
b. scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and 
stations; 
c. scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely 
available. 
ARTICLE IV 
Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: 
a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of 
its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; 
prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its 
recognition or non-recognition of any other State's rights of or claim or basis of claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 
No acts or 
activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for 
asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create 
any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing 
claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is 
in force. 
ARTICLE V 
1 . Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste 
material shall be prohibited. 
2. In the event of the conclusion of international agreements concerning the use of 
nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste 
material, to which all of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to 
participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX are parties, the rules established 
under such agreements shall apply in Antarctica. 
ARTICLE VI 
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60deg. South 
Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in 
any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international 
law with regard to the high seas within that area. 
ARTICLE VII 
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the 
present Treaty, each Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to participate 
in the meetings referred to in Article IX of the Treaty shall have the right to designate 
observers to carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article. Observers shall 
be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate them. The names of observers 
shall be communicated to every other Contracting Party having the right to designate 
observers, and like notice shall be given of the termination of their appointment. 
2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this 
Article shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of 
Antarctica. 
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within 
those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or 
personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers 
designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 
4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica 
by any of the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers. 
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present Treaty enters into force 
for it, inform the other Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice in 
advance, of 
all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all 
expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory; 
all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and 
any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica 
subject to the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty. 
ARTICLE VIII 
1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present Treaty, and 
without prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to 
jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 
1 of Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged under sub-paragraph 1 (b) of Article Ill 
of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such persons, shall be 
subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which they are nationals in 
respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of 
exercising their functions. -
2. Without prejudice to the-provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the 
adoption of measures in pursuance of subparagraph 1 (e) of Article IX, the Contracting 
Parties concerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in 
Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a view to reaching a mutually 
acceptable solution. 
ARTICLE IX 
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the present 
Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two months after the date of entry into 
force of the Treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of 
exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to 
Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and recommending to their Governments, 
measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty, including 
measures regarding: 
use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; 
facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica; 
facilitation of international scientific co-operation in Antarctica; facilitation of the 
exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in 
Article VII of the Treaty; 
questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica; preservation 
and conservation of living resources in Antarctica. 2. 
Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present Treaty by accession 
under Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the 
meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article, during such times as that 
Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial 
research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the despatch 
of a scientific expedition. 
3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the present Treaty shall be 
transmitted to the representatives of the Contracting Parties participating in the 
meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article. 
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall become effective when 
approved by all the Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled to 
participate in the meetings held to consider those measures. 
5. Any or all of the rights established in the present Treaty may be exercised as from 
the date of entry into force of the Treaty wh_ether or not any measures facilitating the 
exercise of such rights have been proposed, considered or approved as provided in this 
Article. 
ARTICLE X 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with 
the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in 
Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the present Treaty. 
ARTICLE XI 
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the present Treaty, those Contracting Parties shall 
consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, 
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means 
of their own choice. 
2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in each case, of 
all parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for settlement; 
but failure to reach agreement on reference to the International Court shall not absolve 
parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of 
the various peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
ARTICLE XII 
1. The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any,time by unanimous 
agreement of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate 
in the meetings provided for under Article IX. Any such modification or amendment 
shall enter into force when the depository 
Government has received notice from all such Contracting Parties that they have ratified it. 
Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into force as to any other 
Contracting Party when notice of ratification by it has been received by 
the depository Government. Any such Contracting Party from which no notice of 
ratification is received within a period of two years from the date of entry into force of 
the modification or amendment in accordance with the provision of subparagraph 1 (a) 
of this Article shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the present Treaty on the date 
of the expiration of such period. 
2. If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force of the present 
Treaty, any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in 
the meetings provided for under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to 
the depository Government, a Conference of all the Contracting Parties shall be held as 
soon as practicable to review the operation of the Treaty. 
Any modification or amendment to the present Treaty which is approved at such a 
Conference by a majority of the Contracting Parties there represented, including a 
majority of those whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX, shall be communicated by the depository Government to all 
Contracting Parties immediately after the termination of the Conference and shall enter 
into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present Article 
If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force in accordance with the 
provisions of subparagraph 1 (a) of this Article within a period of two years after the date 
of its communication to all the Contracting Parties, any Contracting Party may at any 
time after the expiration of that period give notice to the depository Government of its 
withdrawal from the present Treaty; and such withdrawal shall take effect two years after 
the receipt of the notice by the depository Government. 
ARTICLE XIII 
1 . The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. It shall be 
open for accession by any State which is a Member of the United Nations, or by any 
other State which may be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the 
Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX of the Treaty. 
2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shall be effected by each State in 
accordance with its constitutional processes. 
3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the 
Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as the depository 
Government. 
4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding States of the date 
of each deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession, and the date of entry into 
force of the Treaty and of any modification or amendment thereto. 
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the signatory States, the present 
Treaty shall enter into force for those States and for States which have deposited 
instruments of accession. Thereafter the Treaty shall enter into force for any acceding 
State upon the deposit of its instruments of accession. 
6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Government pursuant to 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
ARTICLE XIV 
The present Treaty, done in the English,_French, Russian and Spanish languages, 
each version being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the 
Government of the United States of America, which shall transmit duly certified copies 
thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. 
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